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ABSTRACT
This study addressed the convergence of academic and corporate board governance
practices. The qualitative description case study was conducted through interviews with
chief executive officers (CEOs) who also served as academic trustees. The purposive
sample of chief executive officers represented six colleges and universities located in the
Midwest and Eastern states in the USA, and they embodied diversity in terms of gender
and race. The interview approach brought to the fore the perspectives of the participants
themselves comparing the two board governance models. Board meetings are convened
behind closed doors, and the interviews allowed the researcher to glean the best practices
of the two governance traditions, as described by the participants. The study findings
identified the CEOs’ perspectives on board member selection and expertise; making
decisions; maintaining mission and shareholder value; and, personal and professional
rewards. The study also documented the views of CEOs comparing corporate and
academic board governance on: Corporate influences, notable distinctions, academic
lessons, and best practices in a unique discourse on the convergence of their corporate
and academic governance experiences.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Governance boards are responsible for the ethical, legal, and operational oversight
of the organizations they represent signifying important consequences for society
(Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008). In the social dynamic of principal agency theory
within organizations, the duties of governance are charged to boards of directors in the
corporate construct and in boards of trustees in academia (Adams, Hermalin, &
Weisbach, 2010; Bastedo, 2009). Governance boards are sanctioned to protect the public
interest. In this descriptive case study of board governance, the following chapter will
introduce the research problem, discuss the background on the research, and present the
research questions. The chapter will further identify a description of study terms,
highlight the significance of the study, and disclose the process to accomplish the goals
of the study.
Statement of the Problem
The responsibilities of board members in both corporations and higher education
include financial oversight in addition to the realms of risk management, integrity, and
accountability (Oxholm, 2005). There is limited academic research available on corporate
and academic board governance. Modern day corporate governance is often described in
literature as evolving from an effort to protect shareholder interests, as the growth of
corporations in the nineteenth century increased the number of shareholder investors
(Wells, 2010).
1

Academic governance can be traced to colonial America when early colleges
drew from English common law tradition with states granting charters to higher
education institutions establishing the organizations as public entities. Early academic
governing boards were often populated with state political leaders (Bastedo, 2009). This
arrangement was challenged in 1815, when the president of Dartmouth College attempted
to preempt his board of trustees by altering the college charter to expand the size of the
board from four to 21, in order to convene a self-interested majority of trustees. In the
landmark case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) the original trustees sought
prevention of the adoption of the new charter. The Supreme Court ruled the original
charter was a contract between the state and the trustees, and it could not be altered
without mutual agreement (Bastedo). The case stands as an example of trustee autonomy
in higher education. Today, private colleges and universities are chartered by states, but
governed as directed by the organizations’ bylaws (Bastedo).
Over the years, corporate board governance evolved into a highly government
regulated model, while academic board governance remained unregulated and less formal
despite comparable levels of oversight duties (Hambrick et al., 2008). Jackson, Davis,
and Jackson (2010) described the structure of the six regional associations of higher
education accreditation in the United States, which share common accreditation
compliance standards. Regional accrediting associations hold academic governing boards
accountable for certain aspects of institutional operations in addition to rigorous
academic standards for granting degrees. According to the Higher Learning Commission
of the North Central Association (2013), the Commission accredits an educational
institution itself, but not the entity owner of the institution. Higher education
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commissions do not regulate academic board structure and responsibilities (Jackson et
al.). The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (2010)
acknowledged a lack of government regulation in academic governance:
America’s public and private institutions also depend on government, but they
historically have been accorded autonomy in carrying out their educational
functions through the medium of independent governing boards, working
collaboratively with presidents, senior administrators and faculty leaders. (p. 1)
This study examined insiders’ views of the experiences of corporate and academic
board members in order to contribute to the body of literature with a qualitative
descriptive case study of board governance.
The purpose of the study was to gain knowledge of the organizational dynamics
of board governance typically conducted in closed sessions. This study aimed to add to
the body of knowledge on board governance.
Background
Corporate governance launched into public scrutiny due to scandals and
malfeasances, which contributed to the financial collapse of organizations such as Enron
in 2001, and WorldCom in 2002 (Smith, 2007). In response to public demand for
government intervention and protection, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, a Democrat from
Maryland and Congressman Michael G. Oxley, a Republican from Ohio, introduced
legislation to mitigate risk for citizens who invest in publicly held corporations (Oxholm,
2005). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was passed by Congress, “To protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). According to Oxholm,
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Sarbanes-Oxley does not rest with imposing new requirements on a corporation’s
management and giving new powers to government prosecutors to enforce
compliance. Instead, it totally rewrote the obligations of those who are in a good
position (if not the best) to check up on management: the board of directors and
the external (independent) auditors. The Act now puts them at personal risk if a
corporation under their review misrepresents its financial condition or otherwise
violates the disclosure laws. (p. 364)
The Act does not pertain to non-profit organizations.
The financial failures of Enron and WorldCom resulted in board directors’
fraudulent liability for Enron board members of $168 million of which $13 million was
passed on as personal board member liability. In the case of WorldCom, directors’
fraudulent liability totaled $36 million of which $18 million was passed on as personal
board member liability. The financial liability assessed to board members generated
heightened interest in the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards (Adams et al.,
2010). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) further required the Audit Committee be
composed of outside directors of the board, as well as requiring the chief executive
officer and the chief financial officer certify their organization’s financial statements
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
Traditionally, corporate and academic governing boards meet privately without
the opportunity for direct observation. The private setting of board meetings contributes
to the perceptual lack of understanding of the roles and responsibilities of corporate and
academic board members. Gee (2006), in discussing the convergence of corporate and
academic governance practices suggested, “We need to recognize the basic differences
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between the two sectors in order to understand what constitutes ‘best practices’ for both”
(p. 26).
Academic board governance in private colleges and universities is a non-regulated
organizational construct serving the public interests in higher education. With
responsibilities equivalent to their corporate counterparts, academic boards also have
oversight duties in a principal agent dynamic (Bastedo, 2009). Academic board
governance lacks government regulations to monitor ethical behavior and the formal
oversight and personal liability required of corporate boards.
According to Goins, Giacomino, and Akers (2009), there is evidence that a
number of universities and colleges have voluntarily adopted best practices from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Based on a survey of 100 college and university audit
directors, the researchers revealed a disparity existed among private and public
universities in the area related to external audit services. The data revealed that private
universities showed a greater degree of implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley practices.
Corporate board members are sought out to serve on academic boards for their
business acumen and their ability to financially support the institution (Bastedo, 2009).
Individuals serving on both corporate and academic governance boards provide an
opportunity for formal, regulated governance practices to be introduced to academic
governance (Oxholm, 2005). One method of gaining insights to the board governance
dynamic is to conduct individual interviews to garner perceptions of participants’
experiences. It is unknown how academic governance is, will be, or should be influenced
by the exposure of regulated governance practices being introduced to the non-regulated
academic governance environment.

5

This study focused on gathering perceptions of corporate chief executive officers
who also serve as trustees in private colleges and universities to determine how they
describe their experiences of serving within the two governance models. The study
analyzed how corporate governance requirements or behaviors influence private college
and university board governance.
A lack of academic research on both corporate and academic board governance is
acknowledged in current literature. Studies such as Ning, Davidson, and Wang (2010)
examined optimal corporate board size as a function of firm value, while Jiraporn, Singh,
and Lee’s (2009) research focused on corporate governance effectiveness in relation to
the number of board committees each director was assigned. The quantitative studies
relied on empirical data available in public databases, such as the Investor Responsibility
Research Center and corporate proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Pusser, Slaughter, and Thomas (2006) looked into forms of
organizational networks on academic governing boards based on director interlock
relationships published in public databases. These studies did not include perspectives
from the board members themselves.
There is a lack of corporate governance research focusing on the experiences
described by board members from within this bound group. This qualitative descriptive
case study supplied new information on board governance by gaining insights to
document best practices in corporate and academic board governance functions, while
introducing the potential for a future field of academic research.

6

Research Questions
This study gathered perspectives of chief executive officers who served on
academic boards, and the study addressed the following research questions:
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on both corporate and academic boards
describe their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decisionmaking efficiency, personal and professional rewards, and commitment to the mission of
the organizations?
2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences
academic board governance?
Description of Terms
Board Governance. Derived from Latin term Gubernatus, “to steer” or “to give
direction,” described the oversight responsibilities of a leadership group (Cornforth,
2012, p. 1121).
Coding. The action of identifying a passage or text that exemplifies an idea or
concept (Gibbs, 2007).
Corporate board. Corporate board members are individuals elected by vote of
shareholders of the corporation for specific terms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1815). A court case filed by trustees of the
college against the president of Dartmouth College who attempted to increase the number
of board trustees in defiance of the state charter. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
trustees (Bastedo, 2009).
Elite interview. An interview with a person or persons who are leaders or experts
in a community or in powerful positions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).
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Enron. A firm that was located in Texas accused of fraudulent accounting
practices in 2001, and became the impetus for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (Smith,
2007).
Gatekeeper. People regulating formally or informally the access to a research
field (Flick, 2007a).
Informed Consent. Participants in a study are informed that they are studied and
given the chance to say no to the research (Flick, 2007a).
Insider. Officers, directors and principals of firms who own company stock
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).
Sine qua non. A French language term describing prolonged engagement in sitebased fieldwork in ethnography research for exposure to a group’s natural setting (Leedy
& Ormrod, 2013).
Private Academic Board. Members charged with oversight of the academic
organization by approval of the existing board (Bastedo, 2009).
Public Academic Board. Members charged with oversight of the academic
organization usually by governor appointment (Bastedo, 2009).
Publicly held companies. Firms listed on exchanges where the ownership of the
firm is controlled by shareholders (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act was signed by President George W. Bush
on July 30, 2002, contained reforms designed to change corporate governance in publicly
held corporations (Smith, 2007).
Security and Exchange Commission. The United States Government agency
authorized to enforce the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).
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Significance of the Study
The qualitative methodology was used to gather impressions on the dynamics of
board governance, usually conducted behind closed doors (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The
qualitative study was comprised of interviews, observations, and comparative research
with members of a specific group of chief executive officers who are not often available
to contribute directly to academic research. These design tools supported the purpose of
the study, which was to gather impressions of the how corporate board members describe
their experiences serving on both corporate and academic boards in order to add to the
body of knowledge on board governance.
According to Robson (2011), interviews are usually written in a literary style,
which can be an advantage to researchers with a non-scientific background. In an
environment that does not lend itself to observation, interviews provide authentic
impressions of board governance experiences, as a method of responding to the research
questions.
The population for the study was a purposive sample of governance participants
comprised of chief executives officers of organizations who served as members of both
corporate and academic boards of private colleges and universities. The sample size was
11 chief executive officers who were interviewed to gain their perspectives and
experiences of their dual director and trustee roles. The study participants represented a
diverse population in terms of gender and race. The chief executive officers represented
six academic institutions located in the Midwest and Eastern geographic areas of the
United States. The researcher had the opportunity for direct observation in the role of a
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professional board governance administrator at a private university located in a major city
in the Midwest of the United States of America.
Process to Accomplish
The qualitative case study method is suitable when the research seeks to respond
to a descriptive question (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2012). This case study relied on the
components of individual interviews and direct observation, which examined the
experiences of board members in order to gather insights on the dynamics of corporate
and academic board governance. As Creswell (2013) noted, case study research approach
investigates a bounded system, as it is happening, in order to interpret the experiences in
order to make them known to outsiders.
Salkind (2012) noted that qualitative research was a unique opportunity to seek
knowledge on social and behavioral science. As a design tool, interviews allow data
collection in a broad experiential scope compared to the narrow environment required
when research is designed for a specific hypothesis (Letendre, 2004). The interviews
gathered a broad body of knowledge from insiders of a purposive sample group of
individuals who served as chief executive officers on corporate boards and academic
trustees. In describing interviewing as a method for gathering qualitative data, Kvale and
Brinkmann (2009) noted an “inter-view” as an “inter-change” of views between two
people about a topic of mutual interest rooted in conversations of daily life (p. 2).
The purposive sample size was 11 chief executive officers who Kvale and
Brinkmann (2009) labeled elite interview candidates due to their prominent roles in the
business community. The researcher sought approval from the host University
Institutional Review Board (IRB), as the study relied on human subjects. The researcher
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ensured that validated and ethical procedures were observed. The researcher solicited the
support of the president and the board chairman of a university located in a major city in
the Midwest of the United States of America to act as what Flick (2007b) referred to as
gatekeepers who can open doors to the field to find the right people to interview. The
gatekeepers provided introductions to some subjects for participation in the study, while
other subjects were associates of the researcher. The researcher contacted the participants
by telephone and by electronic email to arrange to meet with the chief executive officers
who agreed to participate in the study. All participants were mailed a letter approved by
the IRB Committee of the host University to formally seek their participation in the
academic study. The participants were not paid, and the researcher obtained informed
written consent from the adult participants, as representatives of their corporate
organizations.
The researcher had two decades of board governance sine qua non or
indispensable observation exposure, which Leedy and Ormrod (2013) referred to as a
useful cultural component in qualitative research. The researcher’s direct observations
and familiarity with board governance was useful, as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) noted
that interviews with elites require the researcher to be knowledgeable about the topic, as
well as being a master of the technical language. Elites are comfortable being
interviewed, and the researcher had to be cautious of subjects exchanging prepared
viewpoints instead of new insights.
The procedures for the semi-structured interview protocol included scheduling
one-hour person-to-person interviews that were digitally recorded for transcription. The
interviews were conducted within a 45-minute period of time, allowing for a wrap-up
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session that did not exceed an interval of one hour. All interviews were conducted during
consistent allotted time parameters. The subjects were asked the same set of semistructured interview questions to provide a methodical opportunity to gather responses.
Before conducting the interviews, the interview questions were piloted by three board
governance experts to validate authenticity.
The interviews were digitally recorded for a thorough, replicated data collection
process. The interviews were scheduled and conducted over a one-year period
commencing in June 2013. The process is further discussed in the qualitative research
methods section.
The qualitative descriptive case study explored the following research questions:
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on corporate and academic boards describe
their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decision-making
efficiency, personal and professional reward, and commitment to the mission of the
organizations? Examples of the semi-structured interview questions are described in
Appendix A.
2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences
academic board governance? Examples of open-ended questions are described in
Appendix B.
The researcher transcribed the entire interview, as Creswell (2013) suggested that
interviews require the voice of participants to speak for themselves, while associating the
author’s preconceived ideas measured against the actual feedback (Salkind, 2012). Gibbs
(2007) recommended the researcher transcribe the interviews using a transcription
machine or by digitizing the recorded interview as an acceptable alternative method.
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Transcription methods are helpful for discourse analysis or conversation analysis by
allowing the researcher to listen for common themes that may be missed by computer
generated transcription software.
Gibbs (2007) suggested software known as computer-assisted qualitative data
analysis (CAQDAS) to analyze qualitative data contained in transcripts. Several
commercial applications available were: ATLAS.ti, MAXqda, NVivo, and Nud.ist, which
have useful search functions, as well as the ability to import and edit rich text files
capable of coding down to a single word search. The repetition of code words can lead to
common themes analysis. The transcripts were analyzed by categorizing data into
common themes with CAQDAS software and researcher interpretation.
Gibbs (2007) acknowledged the use of software in qualitative analysis, referred to
as theory builders, can provide researchers with the tools to develop and test theories. A
potential caution to the use of CAQDAS was pointed out that researchers could become
distant from the words of the respondents. Accordingly, Flick (2007a) acknowledged that
writing has a critical role in qualitative research, “Writing is about research and the
procedures used in it becomes an important instrument for conveying what was done in
the project, how it was done and how well it was done” (p. 139). The researcher’s
training in professional writing was utilized in the transcription phase of the qualitative
descriptive study.
With respect to the ethical aspects of the study, the researcher protected the
anonymity of participants by using pseudonym names to maintain confidentiality, as
Flick (2007b) suggested. During interviews, research questions addressed personal
experiences and the researcher had an obligation to maintain the privacy of the
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interviewees. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) noted that ethical issues evolved throughout
the research process and should be considered an important element in the interview
protocol. Some of the phases where potential ethical concerns should be monitored were:
during the interview situation, which can be stressful for the subjects; in the transcription
phase, which required the research to be loyal to the subject’s statements; and, in the
analysis phase, which necessitated being true to the words of the subjects. In order to
reduce interviewer bias, the researcher must refrain from social cues indicating approval
or disapproval of participants’ responses (Salkind, 2012).
Summary
The researcher proposed to examine how corporate governance requirements
influence private colleges and universities governance practices by gathering the
perspectives of CEOs serving as academic trustees. The researcher conducted a
qualitative descriptive case study, which included semi-structured interviews and direct
observation for data collection. The interviews were conducted with chief executive
officers who served on both corporate and academic boards to garner their perspectives
on the experiences of serving on the two governance models. The research themes
evolved from a review of current literature, as detailed in the following chapter, as well
as the data detailed in the methodology discussion.
Despite the lack of academic research on corporate and academic research from
an insider’s viewpoint, a review of current literature broadens the context of the dynamics
of board governance, as a backdrop to the research. The following chapter further
supports the social relevance this qualitative descriptive case study offers to the
Academy.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction

The focus of research, studies, and articles on board governance differs between
corporate and academic board governance. Corporate board governance research is
embedded in discussions related to firms’ financial performance and accountability to
shareholders. These topics are not relevant to academic board governance. Academic
governance research tends to focus on trustee qualifications and their level of institutional
knowledge. This study expanded the focus of governance research by incorporating the
words and opinions of the participants themselves who served on both corporate and
academic boards, as a method of bridging a gap in academic research. Stone and
Ostrower (2007) contended that governance models exist in most organizations, whole
societies, and communities. Carver (2010) described governance as a worldwide
phenomenon found when individuals working on behalf of others exercise authority and
accountability over enterprises such as corporations, non-government organizations
(NGOs), governments, and non-profit organizations.
According to Rytmeister (2009), university governance was a unique form of
corporate governance with many similar structures to corporate governance. Universities
were complex institutions in terms of accountabilities to internal constituencies and
external stakeholders. In lieu of shareholders in the corporate spectrum, universities have
many stakeholder groups such as students, faculty, staff, community members, and
15

governmental groups. The author acknowledged a deficiency of empirical research on
academic governance (Rytmeister).
Adams et al. (2010) observed that much of the research on corporate board
governance focused on board member selection and board decision processes. Their
research looked at a body of literature concluding that corporate research falls within
three categories: board member selection, firm performance, and board actions. The study
uncovered several descriptive surveys that reflected directors’ responsibilities,
assessment, bargaining power, chief executive officer control, and attributes of the roles
and responsibilities of board members. However, the researchers did not report locating
descriptive research containing interviews with the elites, in their own words, such as this
descriptive case study.
In addition to the lack of corporate and academic research on governance, the
book-publishing arena also witnessed a gap of governance literature as uncovered by
Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) in a 2003 search of the database of book retailer Barnes
& Noble. The authors noted there were 27,220 books on leadership, in contrast to 2,349
books with the keyword of governance. This represented a ratio of 12 to 1.
This qualitative descriptive case study aimed to compare and contrast the two
governance structures of corporate governance and academic governance by exposing
shared characteristics, unique delineations, and the intersection of best practices from
both governance traditions. The study relied on interviews conducted with chief
executive officers serving as academic trustees to provide first-hand knowledge on their
perceptions of the two governance models of corporate and academic governance.
Chapter II concentrates on current literature related to the topics of: Chief Executive
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Officers as Governance Participants, Board Governance Characteristics and Distinctions,
Board Governance Discourse, and summarizes the discussion with a Conclusion. The
chapter commences with The Work of Governance Boards.
The Work of Governance Boards
Historical Context.
The term governance originated from the Latin word gubernatus meaning to steer,
give direction, or manage (Harrison, Murray & Cornforth, 2012). According to Stone and
Ostrower (2007), during the past 25 years, there was political pressure to reduce the
government’s scope and to shift responsibilities for public policy governance
implementation to nongovernmental entities. The researchers affirmed the boundaries
between nonprofit governance and public governance were increasingly fluid and
overlapping suggesting that research on governance must develop to encompass the two
relationships. The authors asserted that drawing on two dissimilar governance structures
could strengthen each interpretation, which was the breadth and depth of this research.
A common definition of modern-day academic governance has been described as
one of deference to the academic authority of the organization (Balch, 2008). According
to Balch, this position contrasted to trustees’ roles in the past, when trustees believed they
had a responsibility to override the academic leadership when necessary. The author
contended that unlike corporate boards, where the governance body and leadership strive
toward mutual understanding, academic governance has developed a governance model
of parallel paths among trustees and leadership.
A study by Adams and Ferreira (2007) defined the role of corporate directors as
both advisors and monitors of management. The hypothesis tested the dual responsibility
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of independent directors and their relationship with the chief executive of the
organization. The purpose of the research was to determine whether the chief executive
should reveal too much or too little information to the directors, when the chief
executives’ goals were centered on creating a friendly relationship with board members.
The researchers determined that the approach of sharing too little information
between the chief executive officer and independent directors allowed for potential
conflicts of interest among independent directors. The data inferred that when there was a
friendly relationship between the directors and the chief executive officer, higher quality
advice was given to the chief executive officer, thus protecting shareholder value, which
was considered a primary objective of corporate board effectiveness. Chait et al. (2005)
discussed the valuable and meaningful characteristics of the work on non-profit boards
through this visual framework.
Table 1
Valuable and Meaningful Work of Nonprofit Boards
Actual Work

Valuable Work

Meaningful Work

Attending board and
committee meetings

Working on and completing
the capital campaign

Interacting with constituents

Authorizing a capital
campaign

Hiring a new CEO

Identifying and working to
solve really important issues
like how we’re going to
increase participation in our
programs

Hiring a new CEO

Annual retreat, were we
discuss the issues we should
be working on to advance the
organization

Note. Adapted from Governance as Leadership: Reframing the Work of Nonprofit
Boards by R. P. Chait, W. P. Ryan, and B. E. Taylor, 2005, p. 172. Copyright 2005 by
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Reprinted with permission.

18

In further defining the roles and responsibilities of governing boards, Chait et al., defined
three responsibilities of governance leadership as fiduciary or stewardship of assets;
strategic or the partnership with management; and, generative defined as the ability to
add value to the organization.

Figure 1. Three primary responsibilities of governance boards. Adapted from
Governance as Leadership, by R. P. Chait, W. P. Ryan, and B. E Taylor, 2005, p. 7.
Copyright 2005 by BoardSource, Inc., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: Hoboken, NJ. Reprinted
with permission.
In a similar vein, Carver (2010) conceptualized the notion of global governance
theory as a theoretical basis for future research. The theory’s range concentrated on: The
purpose of boards; the irreducible minimum elements of accountability among varied
governance venues; and, the concepts and principles that would enable those
characteristics to be optimized.
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Carver (2010) maintained that current literature focused on the components of
governance tasks, in contrast to global governance theory, which was larger in scope and
more rigorous and foundational than the traditional subordinate topics. Global
governance theory promoted use of a common governance language and terminology,
and it sought to improve the public perception of corporate board members to be viewed
as competent, ethical, and accountable stewards.
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) as Governance Participants
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are favorably sought out to serve on governance
boards. Larcker and Tayan (2011) pointed out that CEO-level experience was the single
most important factor in recruiting new corporate directors according to the National
Association of Corporate Directors 2009 survey of public companies. The authors
ascertained that interlock relationships among CEOs account for the common practice of
CEOs of blue chip companies serving on other equally prominent corporate boards. The
researchers provided the example of the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland also served on
the board of Proctor and Gamble. There is growing interest in academic literature on the
CEO directorships examining the use of social power; impact on firm performance; and
interlocking relationships to name a few (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2008; Adams et al.,
2010; and, Pusser et al., 2006).
According to Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) the appointment of outside CEOs to
corporate boards allowed firms the opportunity to advance their own reputation and to
signal to stock market observers that the firms were doing well. Their research indicated
that CEOs were more likely to join boards that already have sitting CEOs as members,
which supported a prestige factor that directorships that provide financial and networking
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benefits were most attractive. This view was consistent with research conducted by Stern
and Westphal (2010), which determined that board appointments were markers of success
among the corporate elite members. The authors pointed out that there were ingratiatory
behaviors that were more likely to yield board appointments. The researchers defined two
forms of ingratiatory behaviors: flattery and opinion conformity. These were attributes
that CEOs tap into when seeking outside board appointments, as well as being exposed to
when selecting directors to their corporate boards (Stern & Westphal).
In a deeper examination into the role of CEOs in governance, research conducted
by Harrison et al. (2012) suggested that there was a tendency to view CEOs in a positive
light simply because of the luster of the role of CEO, irrespective of the specific
individual. However, their study suggested that only respondents who believed their
CEOs possessed competencies in specific leadership qualities viewed them as having
high impact on the nonprofit sector organizations they served. Their study implied that
the perceptions of the followers in nonprofit organizations were worthy of future research
in determining the characteristics of leadership within organizations. This research study
focused on the perspectives of CEOs, as an elite group, well versed in governance
practices.
Board Responsibilities
There have been recent academic governance scandals. An example is the
controversy at the University of Virginia, when the board fired and rehired the same
university president within a three-month period in 2012 (Stripling, 2013). This academic
governance scandal demonstrated disconnected perceptions between academic boards
and university management at a prominent university. Balch (2008) asserted that trustees
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have an important role as mediators and leaders in the academic community. Balch’s
qualitative study on academic governance resulted in a recommendation that trustees
interject more corporate-like governance attributes to academic governance in order to
professionalize governance. Balch’s recommendations supported the research goals of
this dissertation in terms of gaining new information by soliciting the perceptions of chief
executives officers serving on corporate and academic boards.
Brown’s (2011) research supported Balch’s (2008) call for professionalizing
academic governance by determining whether the academic governance system was
flawed or whether it was the best system of governance for universities based on systems
adopted in the United Kingdom. Brown’s research detailed some of the challenges and
weaknesses with the current academic governance model detailed in previous research.
Brown’s conclusion that universities and colleges were moving toward private sector
governance models in terms of accountability was supported by the observation that
policy makers in the United States were attempting to hold leaders accountable as
organizations focused on promoting efficiencies and effectiveness. Brown emphasized
that major reconstruction and reform of academic governance structures were needed to
parallel the corporate sector.
Feyerherm (2009) provided a contrary perspective to both Balch (2008) and
Brown (2011) that examined the university senate model as compared to academic
unions, and to the relationship between academic boards and academic leadership.
Feyerherm acknowledged that as universities have grown in complexity, competing
demands within institutions have evolved into a business-minded approach to
governance. According to Feyerherm, academic governance was not analogous to
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corporate governance, as academic governance required co-learning and co-creating,
compared to corporate governance’s focus on fiduciary oversight and shareholder value.
Feyerherm claimed that the collaborative model required in academic governance was a
departure from the traditional top-down business leadership model. Feyerherm concluded
that this distinction required for the academic governance model was dissimilar to the
corporate governance model.
Board Governance Characteristics and Distinctions
Academic and Corporate Attributes.
Kerr (2004) conducted a study with experts in governance, which exposed a rift
between academia and corporate governance, based on the hypotheses that academics do
not consider business publications as academic research and business executives do not
consider academic research in their business decisions. Kerr recommended methods to
bridge the gaps and sought to discover new data on board governance. Kerr suggested
that further research should focus on: topics that were current and important to
practitioners; academic studies should be conversant with theory and include research
pertaining to topics of interest to practitioners; publication outlets should attempt to reach
targeted audiences; and, business managers and executives should be influenced by
academic research.
Adams et al. (2010) presented descriptions of various surveys related to corporate
governance and concluded that robust research was still needed to provide empirical data
linking the determinants of boards and their monitoring structures. The researchers did
not uncover research linkage to board member perceptions comparing corporate board
service and academic board service or qualitative descriptive research from the
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participants themselves, which was the objective of this study. The researchers
recommended future research opportunities should focus on exposing the relationship
between strong board governance and the implications to business activities and board
independence (Adams et al.).
Pusser et al. (2006) conducted an investigation of the interlock and indirect
interlock relationships among academic trustees in research public universities and
private universities in the United States.
A variation of interlocks, indirect interlocks, occurs when directors of
competing organizations serve together on a third board, as would be the
case if a director of Oracle and a director of Intel served concurrently on
the board of General Motors. (Pusser et al., p.749)
Interlock relationships were viewed as beneficial to organizations in several ways: access
to leadership skills; access to financial institutions; access to current business models;
and, relationship building among members.
The study relied on data collected by the National Science Foundation to
determine the top 10 public and top 10 private institutions that received federal funds for
research during the fiscal years 1999 to 2001. The researchers also looked at institutional
records to identify the names of the board members of the 20 institutions (Pusser et al.,
2006). There were 662 board members identified, and the study cross-referenced those
board members’ names against corporate proxy forms filed with the United States
Security and Exchange Commission to identify members of corporate board of directors.
They determined that of the 662 board members of academic institutions, 413 were
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linked to corporate board positions with the potential of interlock relationships (Pusser et
al.).
The study segregated the data applicable to the public and private institutions and
noted that governing board members at public institutions have fewer members than
private institutions (Pusser et al., 2006). The study suggested that the potential of finding
interlock relationships increased with the size of the boards, thus putting public
institutions at a disadvantage for interlock relationships over private institutions. The
research revealed that the boards of private institutions were considerably more
interconnected than boards of public institutions, and the private institutions had more
interlock relationships with members of corporate board members of Fortune 1,000
organizations with expertise in leadership and decision-making skills (Pusser et al.).
Based on the data, it was determined that the size of academic governing boards
influences the potential for interlock relationships (Pusser et al., 2006). Another
conclusion of the study was that public academic boards have fewer interlock
relationships due in part to the fact the board members were often appointed by state
governors, compared to private institutions with a more robust pool of candidates from a
variety of sources including other board members. One limitation of the research was the
sample size consisting of the largest research-funded institutions whose prominent
reputation rendered them attractive to corporate board members implying a potential bias.
Bowen (2008) suggested that the structure and function of corporate boards
improved over the decade from 1998-2008. The research study identified the key
components required to strengthen board governance. According to Bowen, the annual
Spencer Stuart Board Index provided a source for gathering empirical data on board
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engagement, representation, and director balance of power. The recommendations for
strengthening board governance were: understanding board partnership; recruiting board
members for effective leadership; investment of time and resources for good governance;
distinguishing nonprofit and for-profit board governance convergence; and, recognizing
the rewards of board governance in both sectors. Due to pressure from activist
shareholders, organizations have adopted oversight policies that strengthen governance
roles. Bowen noted that the power of the executive leader required clear definition to
improve collaboration with nonprofit board members. Building constructive partnerships
was recommended for both the corporate and non-profit governance sectors.
Dobbins, Knill, and Vogtle (2011) developed a statistical framework to record
higher education governance changes in Europe. Driven by pressure from the European
Commission, economic, and social demands, higher education has undergone many
changes over the years. They proposed a classification of empirical indicators in this field
based on three historical higher education models: academic self-governance, statecentered model of governance, and the market-oriented model of higher education.
Within the three models, the researchers considered specific industry indicators such as:
balance of power, financial governance, personnel autonomy, and substantive governance
matters in order to provide data for future researchers to trace patterns of change in
academic governance.
Cultural Implications
Baird’s (2006) research focused on developing an academic board culture to
improve the quality of their governance outcomes. Baird acknowledged that excellent
board governance was a difficult task that required trust, knowledge, and commitment, as
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well as the finesse to ask probing questions without challenging the authority of the chief
executive officer of the academic institution. According to Baird, some literature
suggested that corporate boards required a fitness test of board members, as they were
charged with being effective in their board work. Baird acknowledged that academic
boards do not require a similar expertise level of their board members primarily due to a
lack of accountability as compared to corporate board members.
Effective academic board members were likely to endorse professional practices
such as orientation and ongoing development of board members, reviewing the CEOs
performance, and succession planning, as well as reviewing board members performance.
Baird (2006) noted that the definition of an effective board was one that addressed the
value-based and political dimension of the institution. Academic institutions were
charged with serving both a public good and the development of productive citizenry
requiring a business-like approach to governance rooted in accountability. Baird referred
to the proposed model as the professionalization of university governing boards.
An Australian model of university governance monitoring was established in
2002, by implementation of an external audit conducted by the Australian Universities
Quality Agency. The government agency monitored universities against their stated
mission and objectives to determine the level of professional practices. The intervention
used a business-model approach, which departed from the norms of Australian academic
institutions.
Baird (2006) recommended several processes for enhancing university
governance culture, such as:
•

Acknowledgement of competing viewpoints in difficult decisions
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•

Identification of viewpoints held by each board member on the effective role of
board governance

•

Consideration of differing values on the strategic direction of the institution

•

Commitment to design governance practices that include community members’
engagement and celebrate the institutions academic tradition and core values

•

Reflection by board members on research literature related to accountability and
board governance

According to Rytmeister (2009), universities lacked the management processes for
strategic and directional planning required for the increased competition for students,
staff, and resources. The author noted that increased tension developed in role
perceptions and practices when there were deficiencies in the defined role of management
and the role of governance. The governance-management interface required for strategic
discussions and planning can create tensions and pressures not conducive to effective
governance. Based on a study conducted with Australian academic governing boards,
Rytmeister studied board sizes ranging between 15 to 22 members considered a mixed
stakeholder-expertise model of ex-officio, appointed, and elected members.
Relying on grounded theory research approach, Rytmeister (2009) asserted that the
relationship between management and governance was considered assumed rather than
examined. The author recognized that there were limited guidelines and protocols to
ensure good practice and standards of performance specific to academic board
governance and in defining board strategic roles. The study featured a cultural approach
including interviews and observations. The triangulated data consisted of semi-structured
interviews of 36 governing board members, with follow-up interviews taking place one
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year later and through direct observations of governing board meetings in six institutions.
The research revealed that board members with financial and commercial experience
reflected a deeper understanding of governance, as well as understanding the boundary
between governance and management. In terms of strategic planning, survey respondents
considered it within the realm of management by handing off the final approval to the
board viewed as a passive role. This data directly contrasted to the Governance
Leadership Model proposed by Chait et al. (2005) defined as board responsibilities
requiring fiduciary, strategic, and generative accountabilities.
Related to developing board culture, Rytmeister (2009) noted that board
empowerment and engagement could be utilized when there was greater involvement in
strategic planning. The research pointed out that board and executive team one- or twoday retreats were helpful for developing understanding and trust between both member
groups. According to respondents, retreats were considered vital for learning about the
university, and its operating environment. Strategic planning topics were rarely addressed
at regular board meetings, where topics centered on tuition and fees, building approvals,
offshore campuses, rankings, and policy changes over the course of a typical meeting
cycle (Rytmeister).
Rytmeister’s (2009) study indicated that board retreats were rituals within a layer of
behaviors that take on symbolic meaning. The research signaled that board membership
was classified by certain member attributes, such as expertise (knowledge or profession),
experience (university or other organizations), values (collegial or corporate), educational
background (area of discipline), power and influence within the board (proximity to the
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chief executive officer), and power and influence outside the board (networks and
connections).
In terms of cultural expertise, participants stated that strategy was one of the main
responsibilities of the board, and they considered the knowledge and expertise of others,
and themselves, as foundational to the process. These insights were consistent to the
research of Larcker and Tayan (2011), which pointed out that CEO-level experience, was
the most important factor in recruiting new corporate directors. Rytmeister’s (2009)
research indicated that there were many similarities between corporate and academic
governance; however, he acknowledged academic governance involved additional layers
of complexity. According to the research, successful governance required making full use
of the expertise of the governing body members in a culture of trust, understanding, and
input from diverse social groups, which were identified as challenges for governance
groups. These observations were consistent with Migliore’s (2012) study that concluded
that trust among board members was essential for collaboration, innovative change, and
academic excellence.
Migliore (2012) pointed out that a collaborative environment encouraged shared
leadership at all levels of the institution. The researcher asserted that boards have dual
responsibilities as fiduciaries and to effectively allocate resources to achieve an
organization’s mission. Migliore offered this definition, “[. . .] trust is the positive
expectation that another’s motives, behaviors, and competence levels will produce
positive outcomes” (p.31). Trusting relationships were important in order to have
meaningful boardroom discussions about data trends and making improvement decisions.
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Board Governance Discourse
Behind Closed Doors.
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009) studied the perception of corporate
board decisions taking place behind closed doors in a black box. Board meetings were
physically held behind closed doors, and it was not apparent to those outside the inner
workings of this group dynamic what transpired behind the closed doors. The authors
concluded that much of the literature on board governance has created a black box around
board vigilance, consequently creating a rich environment for further research on what
boards do and how board members were selected. This study addressed both concerns by
gathering the perspectives of board members themselves.
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Figure 2. Flow chart of board and corporate leadership input and decisions. Adapted
from Strategic Leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams,
and boards, by S. Finkelstein, D. C. Hambrick, and A. A. Canella, Jr., 2009, p. 228.
Copyright 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York, NY. Adapted with
permission.
Chait et al. (2005) described the black box phenomenon as, “We can see and
appreciate what it produces, but we have little sense of how the work actually gets done.
In some cases, there seems to be little point in trying to understand it” (p. 82). The work
of corporate governance boards and private university academic boards takes place
behind closed doors without the opportunity for direct observation in an environment
perceived as working from within a black box. This descriptive qualitative case study is
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an opportunity to hear from the participants themselves on their perspectives of the innerworkings of the corporate and academic boards they serve.
Beyond the black box phenomenon, other research looked at governance
framework such as a study conducted by Hambrick et al. (2008). The researchers
acknowledged that corporate governance concerns were cross-functional areas within
finance, management, and organizational behaviors of firms. The authors’ focused on a
framework concentrated in the specialties of economics and law considered as both a
micro viewpoint from the internal view of the organization and a macro viewpoint from
the public purview outside the organization.
Their research exposed a different perspective than the frequently discussed
principal-agent model between shareholders and management by considering the impact
of corporate governance and its relevance in the context of broader society (Adams &
Ferreira, 2007). Hambrick et al.’s (2008) research addressed allegations that corporate
governance issues related to concerns within organizations, as well as to labor leaders,
investors, politicians, and regulatory bodies outside organizations. This viewpoint was
consistent with Stone and Ostrower’s (2007) assertion that governance models exist in
many social dynamics, and they have an overarching impact on society.
The seminal research conducted by Michael, Schwartz, Cook, and Winston
(1999) explored academic trustee satisfaction deemed dependent on individual
motivation and persuasion, since trustee positions were voluntary. The study concentrated
on determining elements of satisfaction and on strategies of improving satisfaction in
private and public higher education institutions in the United States. Composed of a
written survey of 500 trustees, the data were analyzed to determine if gender bias and
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level of education factored into trustees’ responses. The research uncovered distinctions
between gender groups, yet noted that the level of a trustees’ education did not appear to
alter the outcome. The authors asserted that research on traditional job satisfaction does
not apply to trustees, as their roles were performed on a voluntary basis and suggested
that future researchers conduct in-depth interviews in order to gain insights not easily
gained through questionnaires, such as the interviews conducted in this study.
Board Effectiveness
Board effectiveness describes an essential component for both corporate and
academic boards in order to resolve issues, to endorse strategic direction, and to adopt
policies. Finegold, Lawler, and Conger (2001) examined a hypothetical scenario of new
chief executive officer, whose board of directors was not engaged at an appropriate level
of board governance participation in order to determine what attributes were needed to
build and to engage effective corporate boards of directors. The researchers concluded
that the motivations for building more effective boards were: to gain strategic advice; to
secure resources; to manage crises; to help develop leadership; and, to increase
shareholder value. The researchers made suggestions for building an effective board,
such as: define the board’s strategic priorities and mission; determine the boards talent
needs; annually assess the chief executive officer and board members; remove ineffective
board members; provide timely information to enable the board; allow time for the board
to operate effectively; and, align director’s interests with the board’s mission.
Letendre (2004) conducted a study on corporate boardroom dynamics and
acknowledged that social science research on the topic was difficult to gather, because
private board meetings did not allow the opportunity for direct observation, as previously
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noted in the discussion on the inner-workings of the black box (Chait et al., 2005,
Finkelstein et al., 2009,). The research consisted of interviews to gather data from board
members on board effectiveness. Letendre’s research approach was similar to the
methodology used in this descriptive case study consisting of interviews to gather data.
Letendre discussed research gathered by Finegold et al. (2001), which looked at survey
data compiled by the corporate board director placement firm, Korn/Ferry. According to
the researchers, the Korn/Ferry survey represented data from directors in 1,000 firms in
the United States. The research correlated board governance to corporate return on
investment and determined that five attributes contributed to board effectiveness:
knowledge, information, power, rewards, and opportunity/time (Finegold et al.). Letendre
recommended three principles to optimize board effectiveness: board size should be
determined by skills needed; meeting time should be adequate to discuss strategies; and,
an annual self-assessment of board members should be conducted.
In discussing board effectiveness, board size is a common research theme. For
instance, Ning et al. (2010) study focused on determining the ideal number of members
on corporate boards to optimize board effectiveness. Their data indicated that since the
2002 Wall Street financial collapse boards with fewer members, ranging from seven or
less, increased in size, while larger boards with 12 or more members, shrunk in size. The
empirical study looked at the reversion trend in board size over time and suggested that
board independence and staggered board structure may be linked to board size. The study
sample of 473 firms was randomly selected from the Center for Research in Security
Prices database, at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, along with data
on board size listed in the proxy statements of publicly traded companies. The researchers
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concluded that based on agency theory, there were costs when boards were too large,
while resource dependency theory pointed out that larger boards were beneficial in
providing access to more external resources (Ning et al.).
Member Qualifications and Composition
The member skill set and composition are critical considerations for both
academic and corporate boards. Hopkins, O’Neil, and Williams (2007) examined a model
for measuring emotional intelligence competencies through a self-assessment
questionnaire of school board members by surveying current and former school board
members in two urban areas in the United States. Emotional intelligence was described as
the capacity to understand one’s own emotions and manage them effectively, as well as
understanding the emotions of others (Hopkins et al.). The study analyzed the
relationship between emotional intelligence competencies and effective board leadership
using a theoretical model called the Emotional Competence Inventory. The data
established that emotional intelligence was a critical factor for effective school boards in
six core competencies: transparency, achievement, initiative, organizational awareness,
conflict management, and teamwork and collaboration (Hopkins et al.).
Supporting the work of Hopkins et al. (2007) the importance of context-specific
board leadership qualifications, Dulewicz (2007) looked at assessing and developing
corporate directors through the Leadership Dimensions Questionnaire (LDQ), which
measured 15 leadership constructs to quantify the level of Emotional Intelligence (EI)
among respondents. According to Dulewicz, high levels of EI benefit directors and some
elements of EI can be developed and exploited.
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In comparison to corporate board effectiveness, academic board composition was
examined in research conducted by de Boer, Huisman, and Meister-Scheytt (2010) as
they surveyed governance structures in universities in three European countries. The
researchers gathered historical data on previous board structures, and the researchers
acknowledged that board governance research was limited on university governing
boards. The study looked at board composition, independence, accountability, and
transparency within the governing boards of universities. The researchers utilized a
comparative study approach to identify how boards were perceived, similarities and
differences between the three countries, and the tensions boards face (de Boer et al.)
The researchers identified tensions between the board and the universities’ top
management and conformance and performance roles, described as attention to detail
versus forward thinking strategic focus. The study revealed that women were
underrepresented on boards in two of the three countries and, irrespective of gender,
members from the private sector were overrepresented (de Boer et al.). The researchers
pointed out that the tensions identified were visible in the governance structure of all
three countries. The authors made recommendations for improving board governance.
Based on the research, they suggested the number of board members could be increased
to enlarge diversity representation, and they suggested that certification training for board
members could compensate for a lack of knowledge in university governance.
Consistent with the work of Adams and Ferreira (2007) research conducted by
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2007) examined corporate board composition in terms of size,
structure, and behaviors related to company performance. Based on a sample of 7,000
firms during the period of 1990 to 2004, listed in the Disclosures database of proxy
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statements filed with the federal government. The study focused on associations between
board structure, board size, and organizational behaviors. The study included a crosssection of firms of various sizes, longevity, and industries focused on board size, board
independence, and board leadership. The researchers concluded that determinants of
board structure and composition vary between small and large firms and the data
suggested that government regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), resulted
in an increase in board size. This study contrasted to the work of Ning et al. (2010) that
indicated a trend toward smaller boards.
Government Regulation.
According to data compiled by the Wilshire 5000 Index, as of September, 2014,
there were 3,818 publicly traded companies in the USA (Waid, 2014). Under the purview
of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), publicly traded companies were
required to abide by rules and regulations that protect investors from fraudulent
behaviors. In recent years, governance matters have entered the domain of the SEC,
specifically with the introduction of legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002).
In the 2012 Annual Report issued by the SEC, the following text provided a
summary of the remedy efforts the agency has accomplished:
Since the financial crisis, the SEC has filed 80 financial crisis actions against 117
individuals and entities, including 57 CEOs, CFOs, and other senior corporate
officers. These enforcement actions have resulted in 36 individuals being barred
from serving in the securities industry or as officers or directors at public
companies as well as orders of more than $2.2 billion in disgorgement, penalties,
and other financial relief, most of which has been or will be distributed to harmed
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investors. In addition, 36 individuals have been barred from the securities
industry, from serving as officers and directors of public companies, and/or from
appearing or practicing before the Commission. (Security and Exchange
Commission, 2002, p. 13)
According to the Higher Education Directory (2013), there were 3,997 public and
private institutions of higher education as of fall 2012 enrollment records. Within this
composite number, 2,415 were private institutions, the category represented in this
descriptive case study. From a governance perspective, private academic institutions of
higher education face regulation oversight by national and regional institutions such as
the Higher Learning Commission of North Central Association (2013), while their
governance oversight remains unregulated compared to the scrutiny imposed by the SEC
on the 12,000 publicly traded corporate boards (Skeel et al., 2011).
Both corporate and academic governance function within regulatory jurisdictions
that influence how they conduct their business. Oxholm (2005) examined the
implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and explored aspects in which the intent
of the Act was consistent with the aspirations of academia, and suggested applications
colleges and universities could adopt as best practices from the Act. The purpose of the
Act was to protect corporate investors by improving transparency from publicly traded
corporations. The Act was not intended to apply to non-profit organizations, but the
author provided a perspective on how the Act related to higher education in terms of
corporate accountability. The author noted that the Act addressed financial oversight, as
well as broader issues related to risk, integrity, and accountability. According to Oxholm,
these best practices were necessary to guide conduct in higher education, similar to their

39

application to publicly traded corporations. The author recommended that best practices
from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, should be adopted in academia before scandals
force the requirement.
Conclusion
Since the Wall Street financial crisis of 2002, there has been heightened research
interest in the topic of board governance. This literature review illustrated that there is
limited academic research employing descriptive qualitative studies based on the
perspectives and opinions of the board members themselves. Larcker and Tayan (2011)
identified CEO level experience as the single most important functional background for
board members. The participation of CEOs in this qualitative descriptive case study
added authenticity to the perspectives of chief executive officers serving on both
corporate and academic boards. The chapter highlighted some of the current research on
both academic and corporate governance, largely developed as quantitative studies reliant
on existing database content and custom surveys instead of interviews with the
participants themselves.
Feyerham’s (2009) research called for the professionalization of academic boards,
while Oxholm (2005) specifically supported the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(2002) best practices for academic boards. Corporate boards have been scrutinized by
regulations enforced by the SEC with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, but compliance does
not apply to academic boards.
Summary
In selecting a qualitative research study, this author attempted to unpack how
people construct the world around them (Flick, 2007a). Flick suggested that through
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approaches such as compiling the experiences of individuals or groups; interactions and
observing practices; or analyzing documents that trace the experiences of individuals and
groups, qualitative research has entered an unprecedented period of growth in academia.
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) supported the use of interviews to assist in understanding
the world from the subject’s viewpoint. The authors described interviews as the active
process between interviewees and interviewers that produced knowledge. Flick
reinforced Kvale and Brinkmann’s position by asserting that qualitative research was an
inquiry project that aims to change the world through data collected from interviews
using the procedures of coding and content analysis, similar to the method used in this
research, computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA).
The following chapter described the qualitative methods applied to this research
study. As Chapter III unfolded, this writer borrowed from the analogy described by
Collins (2001) in summarizing that the right people are in the right seats on the bus, as
momentum builds on the journey of discovering new perspectives on board governance.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The review of literature revealed that there is limited academic research on
corporate and academic board governance, and this author could not uncover academic
research on the convergence of corporate and academic governance, the focus of this
study. Governance boards are responsible for the ethical, legal, and operational oversight
of the organizations they represent signifying important consequences for society
(Hambrick et al., 2008). Corporate governance is highly regulated by the government,
while academic governance is an unregulated dynamic in not-for-profit colleges and
universities (Adams et al., 2010; Bastedo, 2009). This research is a qualitative descriptive
case study of the perspectives of chief executive officers who serve as academic trustees
to gather their perspectives related to serving on both corporate and academic governance
boards.
The Methodology Chapter contains a discussion on the Research Design, the
Population of the participants in the study, a review of the Research Questions, details on
the Data Collection and Analytical Methods, the Limitations of the Study, and the
Conclusion.
Research Design
The qualitative case study method is suitable when the research seeks to respond
to a descriptive question (Gay et al., 2012). This qualitative descriptive case study relies
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on the components of individual interviews and direct observation, which examined the
experiences of corporate and academic board members in order to gather insights on the
dynamics of corporate and academic board governance. As Creswell (2013) noted, case
study research approach investigates a bounded system, as it is happening, in order to
interpret the experiences to make them known to outsiders. This approach was selected to
respond to the research questions.
The researcher has two decades of board governance sine qua non or
indispensable observation exposure, which Leedy and Ormrod (2013) referred to as a
useful cultural component in qualitative research. The author’s direct observations and
familiarity with board governance are consistent with Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009)
suggestion that interviews with elites require the researcher to be knowledgeable about
the topic, as well as being a master of the technical language.
The purpose of the study was to gain knowledge of the dynamics of board
governance typically conducted in closed sessions. This study aimed to add to the body
of knowledge on board governance traditionally conducted behind closed doors without
the opportunity for direct observation.
Research Questions
The qualitative descriptive case study had two research questions:
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on both corporate and academic boards
describe their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decisionmaking efficiency, personal and professional reward, and commitment to the mission of
the organizations?

43

2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences
academic board governance?
The questions used for the interviews are detailed in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Population
The study participants were selected for their experience in, and knowledge of,
board governance practices. The participants were business acquaintances of the
researcher at various times over the past 20 years, or the gatekeepers introduced them to
this researcher. The 11 chief executive officers represented a purposive population, and
they were diverse in terms of demographics related to gender: 10 men, one woman and
related to race: seven Caucasians, three African Americans, and one Hispanic. The chief
executive officers represented six private colleges and universities located in the Midwest
and Eastern geographic areas of the United States. The study participants were affiliated
with corporations located in the Midwest and Southwest geographic areas of the United
States with student populations ranging from more than 1,400 to more than 15,500, as
detailed in Table 2.
Approximately 80% of the study participants described their associations with
publicly traded corporations, and 20% described their associations with corporations that
were privately held corporations. Gibbs (2007) recommended anonymization, which was
incorporated in this study to keep the participants’ names and organization associations
confidential within the dissertation document. The researcher described the
confidentiality standards to the participants both in the written Informed Consent
document and verbally at each interview.
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Table 2
Participants’ Demographic Data and Study Identification Codes
Participant

Biography

Corporate Board

Academic
Institution

Academic Board

Trustee 1

Male, Caucasian
retired CEO and
Board Chair of a
publicly traded
global Consumer
Retail Corporation
located in the
Midwest
Male, African
American CEO of
privately held
conglomerate
located in the
Midwest

Board Chair and
more than 20
years board
member of
publicly traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board member
more than 20
years of
corporate
publicly traded
utility located in
the Midwest
Board Chair three
years of publicly
traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board member
more than 10
years of publicly
traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board Chair and
member more
than 15 years of
publicly traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest

Board 1

Board Chair and
member of private
university located in
the Midwest more
than 20 years with
enrollment of
>15,500 students

Board 2

Board member of
private university
located in the
Northeast for six
years with enrollment
of >1,400 students

Board 3

Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest for nine
years with enrollment
of >15,500
Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest more than
10 years with
enrollment of
>15,500
Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest more than
10 years with
enrollment of
>15,500 students

Trustee 2

Trustee 3

Trustee 4

Trustee 5

Female, Caucasian
CEO of publicly
traded Healthcare
Services
Corporation located
in the Midwest
Male, African
American CEO of
privately held
Wealth Management
Firm located in the
Midwest
Male, Caucasian
CEO of publicly
traded Global
Healthcare
Corporation located
in the Midwest
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Board 3

Board 1

Participant

Biography

Corporate Board

Academic
Institution

Academic Board

Trustee 6

Male, African
American CEO of
publicly traded
Global Consumer
Services
Corporation located
in Europe
Male, Hispanic CEO
of privately held
Consumer Products
Corporation

Board member
more than 20
years of publicly
traded consumer
retail corporation
located in a
Western State
Board Chair of
privately held
corporation more
than 10 years
located in the
Southwest
Board member
for two years of
publicly traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board member
more than 20
years of publicly
traded
corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board member
for more than 20
years of privately
held corporation
located in the
Midwest
Board Chair and
member for more
than 10 years of
publicly traded
corporation
located in an
Eastern State

Board 1

Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest for nine
years with enrollment
of >15,500 students

Board 4

Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest for 10 years
with enrollment of
more than >6,500
Board Vice Chair of
private university
located in the
Midwest for nine
years with enrollment
of >6,500
Board Chair and
member of private
college more than 15
years with enrollment
of >3,200

Trustee 7

Trustee 8

Trustee 9

Trustee 10

Trustee 11

Male, Caucasian
CEO of publicly
traded Global
Consumer Services
Corporation located
in the Midwest
Male, Caucasian
CEO of privately
held Consumer
Services
Corporation located
in the Midwest
Male, Caucasian
CEO of privately
held Financial
Services
Corporation located
in the Midwest
Male, Caucasian
CEO of privately
held Consumer
Products
Corporation located
in an Eastern State
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Board 4

Board 5

Board 6

Board 1

Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest for nine
years with enrollment
of >6,500
Board member of
private university
located in the
Midwest for six years
with enrollment of
>15,500 students

Data Collection
The time intervals of the interviews were conducted within 45-minutes, allowing
for a wrap-up session that did not exceed an interval of one hour for all study
participants. The recordings ranged in length of time from 20 to 57 minutes to maintain
the maximum time of one hour in accordance with the interview protocol. The
participants were asked the same interview questions to provide a methodical opportunity
to gather responses. The interview questions are stated in Appendix A and Appendix B.
The interviews were conducted over a period of time from October 2013 to June
2014. The location of eight of the interviews took place in the offices of the CEOs, and
three interviews were conducted the researcher’s office. One interview was conducted by
speaker telephone in the researcher’s office. All interviews were conducted in a private,
professional setting to maintain confidentiality. The study participants were not
compensated for their time, but they were given an A.T. Cross pen as a token of
appreciation for their time and involvement. Ten of the interviews were digitally recorded
using both an Olympus Digital Voice Recorder for producing a MP3 audio file, and a
Zoom HN4 Handy Digital Recorder for producing a WAV audio file. The two devices
produced identical files that were stored for transcription in the two audio archival
methods. One interview was conducted by taking notes.
The interviews were transcribed from the audio files using Dragon Dictate for
MAC (3.0) Speech Recognition Software (2012). The researcher dictated the content
from the audio-recorded interviews by listening through an audio ear bud, while speaking
the content of the audio file into the Dragon Dictate with the microphone headset
supplied with the software. The software was preloaded with a profile of the researcher’s
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voice in the manner recommended and supported by Dragon Dictate. Gay et al. (2012)
described Dragon Dictate as useful for writing interview narratives.
The researcher confirmed the accuracy of the transcription through repeated
comparisons from the recorded file to the transcribed rich text format (RTF) document.
When the content of the RTF document was proofed for accuracy, it was also saved and
copied into a Word document for coding purposes. The RTF documents were uploaded to
the software ATLAS.ti database for computer assisted qualitative data analysis
(CAQDAS). Gibbs (2007) recommended verbatim transcriptions or summarizing the gist,
as natural speech is often non-grammatical. Careful listing was applied through the audio
recording and the researcher’s notes from the interviews. All original audio files and
transcribed documents were password secured on the researcher’s personal computer,
which was retained in a secured home office.
Reliability and Validity
Reliability in qualitative research does not have statistical tests and instrument
standards such as those available to quantitative research. The researcher ensured that the
data was collected in a consistent manner utilizing similar techniques for each interview
to safeguard reliability in this study (Gay et al., 2012).
Similar to quantitative studies, this qualitative study addressed the important
aspect of validity by establishing trustworthiness in terms of, and understanding of, the
research findings. Descriptive validity is the factual accuracy of the text, which was
achieved through deep, repeated reading of the transcripts of the interviews and the
researcher’s notes from the interviews (Gay et al., 2012).
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Theoretical validity required the researcher to report on the phenomenon
described in the research questions (Gay et al., 2012). Every effort was made for this
study to report on the perspectives of CEOs who serve as Academic Trustees comparing
the two governance structures as detailed in Chapter IV.
Evaluative validity defined the importance of the research to report the findings in
an unbiased manner (Gay et al., 2012). The researcher acknowledges the opportunity for
bias, and made every attempt to report the findings without judgment or prejudice.
Before conducting the interviews, the research questions were piloted by a
corporate board governance expert and two academic governance experts to validate
authenticity. The subject matter expert on academic governance was a professor at
Harvard University and a well-known in professional organizations such as the
Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities (AGB), which provides
seminars and workshops on academic boards. A second academic governance expert
employed by the AGB reviewed the research questions and suggested certain wording
changes to the interview questions, which were incorporated. The corporate board subject
matter expert was a professor in the Australian School of Business at the University of
New South Wales, with a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago who
authored many academic journal articles on corporate board governance.
Analytical Methods
The methodology selection of interviews with elites who were knowledgeable on
corporate and academic governance was chosen to respond to the two research questions.
Board meetings are typically held behind closed doors without the opportunity for direct
observation. The researcher deemed that including the perspectives of chief executive
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officers using their own words was the best method to respond to the two research
questions.
The study relied on computer assisted qualitative data analysis software
(CAQDAS) for content management in order to analyze the qualitative data contained in
the transcripts and interview notes. The researcher selected the software ATLAS.ti, (7.1)
(2014) for this purpose, which was referenced by both Leedy and Ormond (2013) and
Gibbs (2007) as being useful for storing and identifying codes and patterns in qualitative
data. The software was described as being beneficial in the inductive approach referred to
as open coding, creating new codes, and existing codes, and for its ability to perform
lexical searching to link codes. CAQDAS entered the marketplace in the 1980s, and they
have gained popularity in assisting with qualitative research data management (Gibbs).
Through proprietary tools offered by ATLAS.ti, (7.1) (2014) including a webinar
and a Quick Tour Study Guide, the researcher was able to acquire knowledge of the
advanced capabilities of the software such as, categorizing data, interlinking data
segments, data analysis and theory-building by utilizing word cruncher and query tools.
Word cruncher created a word frequency count that could be used for identifying
correlations among participants’ remarks by gathering commonly used terms used to
respond to the interview questions.
The software provided a visual display for word frequencies, and a query tool
allowed the researcher to retrieve quotations, predetermined codes and code-families, and
categories by utilizing data tracking referred to as a Hermeneutic unit (ATLAS.ti, 7.1,
2014). The software categorized code words leading to common themes analysis. The use
of coding in data collection allowed for the potential of correlating thematic responses
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from the study participants. According to Flick (2007b), coding and categorizing are the
most prominent methods for analyzing qualitative research. By utilizing the ATLAS.it
(7.1) (2014) computer software the researcher reinforced the aspect of validity to the text
analysis.
The ATLAS.ti (7.1) (2014) query tool called Code Co-occurrence identified all
codes that co-occur across all of the transcribed documents of interviews resulting in a
cross-tabulation of all codes. Results can be displayed in either a tree view or data matrix
view. This was useful in the evidence analysis of the content of the multiple interviews
for exploring patterns of responses to answer the research questions further discussed in
the study results in Chapter IV.
Limitations
The author acknowledged that qualitative research is wrought with both rich
content and physical barriers. The research was reliant on text for analysis, and text from
the interview transcriptions and the interview notes created a volume of data to
synthesize. Analysis required filtering systems to respond to the research questions,
which was subject to the researcher’s bias. Every effort was made to reduce the
researcher’s bias, yet the qualitative research process demands the bias must be
acknowledged (Gay et al., 2012). Additionally, CEOs can be cautious of sharing their
unbiased opinions since their experience participating in academic research can be
limited. This group frequently participates in conversations in the public arena reporting
on issues related to shareholder concerns and financial performance. This study sought
opinions and perspectives not related to financial performance.
The study participants consisted of a purposive pool of CEOs who served as
Academic Trustees, which is a narrow cross-section of a specific group of people. This
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limitation could be resolved in future studies by inviting other corporate leaders, such as
Chief Financial Officers, General Counsels, and Auditors who serve on Academic Boards
to provide their perspectives on the two governance structures to increase the depth and
breath of the scope of a study on board governance.
An additional limitation was that the study focused on private colleges and
universities. Public university boards are typically smaller than private boards and the
members are usually appointed to serve by a state governor, and perspectives from
academic board members in that pool were not included in this study. Finally, as a
qualitative study, this descriptive case study lacked the experimental elements commonly
found in quantitative studies that could lead to predictive possibilities on board
governance.
Summary
This qualitative descriptive case study of the perspectives of CEOs who serve as
Academic Trustees was conducted utilizing interviews with this elite, purposive
population. The researcher integrated validity into the study by establishing
trustworthiness between the participants in this context-bound study (Gay et al., 2012).
The deep reading of the text of the transcripts and interview notes incorporated reliability
by considering the consistency of the interview process and by considering how the
consistency of interview questions were collected over time. The relevant content that
was disclosed in this qualitative descriptive case study of the perspectives of CEOs who
serve as Academic Trustees is furthered discussed in Chapter IV, Findings and
Conclusions.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive case study on the perspectives of chief
executive officers serving as academic trustees was to add to the body of knowledge on
the dynamics of board governance from an insider’s viewpoint. The study incorporated
the words of the board members themselves to expose shared characteristics, unique
delineations, and best practices from the two governance traditions. There were two
research questions that guided this study. The chapter contains details of the Findings,
Conclusions, and Implications and Recommendations. The discussion begins with the
Findings.
Findings
The sample of participants consisted of a purposive, homogenous group of 11
(N=11) chief executive officers who also served as academic trustees (Leedy & Ormrod,
2013). In this study, the categorical profile data (N=11) of the participants included
representation of two independent variables of: Ethnicity (three levels of Caucasian 64%,
African American 27%, Hispanic 9%) and Gender (two levels of male 91%, female 9%).
Larcker and Tayan (2011) pointed out that having chief executive officer (CEO)
experience was the most significant criteria for becoming a member of a board, while
Stern and Westphal (2010) described board appointments as markers of career success.
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The following findings were the result of interviews conducted with this purposive
sample of elite CEO board members.
Themes
A coding hierarchy was established to categorize the participants’ responses.
First, open coding was utilized by a line-by-line review of the transcripts from the
interviews by comparing individual participant’s responses to others. This was achieved
through manual review of the transcripts, as well as through lexical searching in
ATLAS.ti, and the researcher’s interview notes. The procedure of open coding analysis
was followed by axial coding, a filtering process used to narrow the themes and concepts
from the open coding (Gibbs, 2007). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) pointed out that
thematizing interviews clarifies the theme of the study by adding conceptual and
theoretical understanding to the phenomena investigated.
Research Question One: How do chief executive officers who serve on both
corporate and academic boards describe their experiences comparing the two governance
models in terms of decision-making efficiency, personal and professional rewards, and
commitment to the mission of the organization?
The following four themes emerged in response to Research Question One: 1.
Board Membership: Selection and Expertise; 2. Making Decisions; 3. Maintaining
Mission and Shareholder Value; and, 4. Personal and Professional Rewards.
Board Membership: Selection and Expertise.
A prominent theme that surfaced during the discussion on how corporate boards
influence academic boards focused on how members were selected. Trustees 1, 2, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, and 11, roughly 82% of the 11 participants remarked that the academic board
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asked for members to recommend individuals they knew from their business
relationships, in contrast to Trustees 1, 3, 4, and 6 who indicated they were selected to the
academic board because they were alumnus. All trustees except 4 and 6, approximately
82% of the 11 participants, noted corporate boards asked for board member
recommendations when filing vacancies. The processes were not dissimilar between
corporate and academic boards seeking personal referrals for board candidates, though
using a professional search firm in either board searches was not a common practice. The
findings supported Pusser et al.’s (2006) research that identified corporate board interlink
relationships were prominent among individuals serving on corporate boards.
Trustee 10: On the recruiting of new corporate members, a lot of it was with other
people you knew. You wanted some people that had stature in the community and
expertise in your area, so you're not starting from ground zero in educating
somebody. There was a vetting process that arrived at somebody that would be
acceptable, and they could sell the stockholders as well. We did not use an outside
firm, as other directors know a lot of people. For the academic board a lot goes
into this question on the selection process for academic boards. Many are people
you know. For people who will be involved in a nonprofit, it is also one of the
more expensive jobs they will have because you are expected to make
contributions to the college. It does not mean you have to have expertise in the
institution, because most people don't. But, you get a broad group of people.
There is a big push in colleges for diversity and that's a little difficult to achieve to
get qualified people with a diverse background, because some of those diverse
areas have smaller populations. You want to get somebody that would be a good
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contributor. All boards do that today, but when you have a large board to fill it is
a challenge. You really look for people, that as I always tell the presidents of the
college, consider the trustees your personal consultants. You are not going to use
them all, but if there’s 10 of them that you can draw expertise from, guidance
from, counsel from, do it. Command is a lonely position, and it helps to have
places to go when you have a problem.
Trustee 9: The selection process for the corporate board is autonomous. I use the
senior team to vet potential candidates and the decision-making is usually through
the corporate office to make sure there is no objection. And we check with the
General Counsel as well. The board members are appointed not selected. This is a
private company so that allows us to do things different than a public bank
corporation would do. In terms of expertise, community involvement is very
important, as those are people who are well networked. And we try to get people
that have different business demographics: Manufacturing, healthcare, and the
service industry, so we try to get the mix of people with different professional
backgrounds. We do not use a search firm for board members, but I have thought
about it. I have talked to somebody locally about that, but we are not going to that
method as of yet.
Trustee 11: The directors were all selected for their talent and special
backgrounds in audit, finance or operations. The board selection process was
people that had backgrounds in the metals business. We had a finance expert who
served on President Sr. Bush's advisory council. Another was a former auditor
and controller with U.S. Steel, and he was head of the audit committee. Most of
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the board members were selected on backgrounds with metals companies or
finance companies or some type of operating background; those are the three
buckets we looked at. We did not use a search committee. The selection process
came from either people we know in Chicago or Pittsburgh. One came as a
recommendation from my brother, and another person was an academic. The
other people I personally know in the steel business. The selection process for the
academic board I have not been personally involved, but I have been involved in
the governance committee that the candidates are brought up through. The
expertise on the academic board is more finance background and governance
related backgrounds, so everyone understands what governance is and the shared
responsibilities. When they are vetting people with those backgrounds they will
probably be stronger members.
Trustee 5: The selection process for the corporate board is detailed in our proxy.
There is a rigorous process. Sometimes we get nominations from left field, and
we will read those, but there is an established process. We hired an outside
research firm that we typically go to. Since I've been at my organization, we've
brought on five new directors, and we have done that through the same search
firm. As long as they deliver high-quality candidates the same search firm is
knowledgeable of the culture of the company and what we're looking for. We are
very transparent in what qualities we are looking for in directors and transparent
as to the processes by which candidates get surfaced.
Trustee 6: The search process for the corporate board was done through a search
committee using a search firm. They called me and asked if I was interested in a
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director's seat. I interviewed with the lead director and the CEO. I was involved in
other board member searches. They would give a list to the board members to see
if we knew anybody on the list. In some cases board members interviewed
potential candidates. They were looking for certain expertise, for instance, when I
was being recruited, they were looking for people that knew about the telecom
industry and that was my direct responsibilities at my organization. I knew the
industry quite well. The selection process for an academic board is really unclear.
In terms of expertise, academic boards like to bring in people that have
competencies to know what they need, for example, people who know
construction during a building boom. People that understand healthcare, while we
board members don't know anything about running a university, similarly, when I
was on a Symphony board none of us were musicians.
Trustee 8: The corporate board selection process was generally tapping into
networks of existing board members by asking people who would be a good fit
from a board perspective because teamwork and interaction was very important in
a corporate environment. There was some balancing of skills, for instance, for the
finance committee you needed SEC definition of financial expert. More of it was
people you knew who would be a good fit culturally. At the time you're looking
for more diversity on the board so that became criteria. The chair also worried
about who would be friendly to his point of view. There was a practical reality of
how people got picked. The chair was the head of the governance committee. The
board members did not get to meet the incumbent people that were up for board
positions. They did meet the members of the governance committee, but they did

58

not meet the other members of the board. For the academic board selection, we
need board members who have those networks that we can tap into, and we are
trying to raise money. Money and the ability and willingness to give are number
one criteria. As a private institution, where values are based on alignment with the
mission and values of the University, is also an important prerequisite. Relevant
life and business experience that would help is a nice thing, but the first two are
probably the main things that we use for criteria for new board members.
Trustee 7: When I'm looking for new corporate board member, I look at what can
they bring to the board what type of experience can they bring to the board. For
example, one person came on the board that had a marketing background with
many of our third party customers. I look at what our current needs and current
strategies are. A third outside board member is a lawyer and CPA out of LA. He
helps at the finance committee, and he needed to be outside the company with
those competencies. So, we built the board to fit those strategies and
competencies. The selection process for of the academic board there is a
trusteeship committee that does the nominations and profiles. We needed
expertise in nursing, and we added a female member who is a CEO of a large
hospital. So, I would say we are looking for expertise and for people who are in
an economic position to donate as well. So, it’s a balance between those two.
Trustee 1: The selection process for corporations is personal contacts sometimes
search firms are used, and interviews take place and background checks are made.
They look for corporate experience. Various attributes the board members
demonstrate are success in their business life, and they hone it down to a few
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candidates and usually the chairman of the board and the CEO conduct personal
interviews with the last candidates. In a corporate board, the expertise level is a
high level of business leadership, social responsibility, financial experience, and
success in leading whatever businesses they were involved in.
Trustee 2: For the corporate board, in terms of experience in a certain field, it
might be finance and business those were the two peak areas that people that
served in looking at the various committees. We needed people with experience
for each committee. For example, the audit committee had people that already
served on audit committees with industry experience, which we brought to the
table. The board felt that was important, because each of us had fiduciary
responsibility to the shareholders to make sure that things are being done right.
We looked at various goals and strategies of the company, and not only if it
included reaching the financial goals set by the CEO and approved by the board,
but it also included areas of sustainability and things of that nature as well.
Academic board selection: Certain criteria that the academic board would be
looking for depending on the time they may be looking for somebody with
background human resources or accounting, but typically they looked for
leadership. People that are leaders in their community well thought of in their
community, and are accustomed to getting things done. They can bring those
resources to the table to help at any given time to move some of the initiatives and
goals of the University.
Trustee 3: The selection process for new board members were pretty typical for
corporate boards, to rely a lot on recommendations by existing board members.
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There would be discussions about what the board needed and the capabilities we
wanted to bring on and the existing board members networks would be activated.
From there, the governance committee oversaw it. A board member was the chair
of a major professional search firm, so he tapped into a supercharged
knowledgeable person for that role. We would add additional names to the pile.
The company may down the road use a search firm, but at the time the company
was only a public company for two years and in the interest of time, the networks
seem to work well with expertise. The biggest thing with that we were looking for
was somebody that had contemporary CEO of a public company experience and
had a track record of driving the kind of quick results - it couldn't be a safe hands
caretaker CEO of a public company. We were looking for that bull's-eye of
somebody that really created something and had grown it rapidly over a period of
time. It was a hard spec to find.
Trustee 3: For the academic board, a small group of the executive committee
knows a lot more than I on this topic. People are looking for an alumnus that has a
great deal of success and might feel their affiliation with the University helped
drive that success and they want to devote their energy and philanthropic
investments in the University.
Trustee 4: The expertise level for corporate board members is a history of success,
active in the community, and have risen to the highest level of their profession.
The expertise level sought for academic board memberships are similar to
corporate but more community involvement and commitment to the University.
At my University there are a lot of alumni on the board.
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Board Member Interlocking Relationships.
The common practice of recommending future corporate board members and
academic trustees was cited by Pusser et al. (2006), as a source of increasing trust among
board members. These interlock relationships were common on corporate boards, and
they have been adopted by academic boards, as governance networks increased.
According to the researchers, the larger the size of academic boards increased the
probability of interlock relationships, and they noted that the phenomenon was selfperpetuating on private boards reliant on drawing membership from current board
members.
In a related study, Adams and Ferreira (2007) looked at the relationship between
corporate board members and the chief executive officer. The data inferred that when
there was a friendly relationship between the directors and the chief executive officer,
higher quality advice was given to the chief executive officer, thus protecting shareholder
value. This research focused on the important role relationships have on corporate board
effectiveness. Many of the participants of this dissertation affirmed the position of Adams
and Ferreira.
Trustee 2: The selection process for academic board membership is mostly
personal contacts. In a corporate board the expertise level is a high level of
business leadership, social responsibility, financial experience, and success in
leading whatever businesses they were involved in. The expertise level on the
academic board members would be very much the same with the addition of
willingness to support the University financially. All corporate board members
were asked to give names that would make a contribution to the board, such as
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people that they served with on other publicly traded boards. That was always a
good source of talent getting a personal recommendation from a key executive in
the community that was very important, and that was as good, if not better than a
search firm. They attempted to have a good representation of the community.
They wanted a diverse board.
Trustee 9: In terms of academic board member expertise, we look for financial
expertise, investment expertise, academic, and real estate. I chair the plant and
building committee, so we look for that background. Development capabilities are
certainly important and people that are well-connected. Representation from the
major companies in town, the Fortune 500 companies are important. A
combination of having the networking ability and those people also come with a
fair amount of business acumen as well.
Making Decisions.
Migliore and DeClouette (2011) pointed out that a collaborative environment
encouraged shared leadership at all levels for effectively making decisions, as fiduciaries
related to allocation of organizational resources. The researcher asserted that trusting
relationships were key to meaningful boardroom discussions. The participants in this
descriptive case study affirmed Migliore’s work inferring that decision-making is
complex in both corporate and academic boards.
Trustee 10: Corporate level decision-making is probably not as shared simply
because of the timeframe and the intensity of the things the board has to get done.
I'm a strong believer in working with business plans and colleges have not been
very good at doing that over the years. That helps you make your decisions. It is
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your mission, it has what you're doing to protect the brand, and it is a document
that if anybody even at colleges when people want to do their own things and they
can stray. It’s easy to take the document and say this was not in the plan. It gives
you a guide. Decision-making is easier in the corporate level in terms of timing of
it. Colleges the ramifications may be a little more laborious.
Trustee 9: The academic boards are much slower things because we meet
quarterly. You might come to the committee one quarter and then it gets vetted at
the next quarter, finalized and brought to the board a year later. I’m always
amazed at the things that we’ve been talking about for years. Sometimes whether
or not it’s getting through the committees, dealing with the faculty and their
approval is a much more timely process. Whereas the corporate board, as a public
for-profit public company, they have an obligation to the shareholders to bring to
bear decisions in a much quicker fashion. I would say the time frame is one of the
big differences. The vetting process is probably deep and rich in both institutions,
but the ability to move it along quicker in the public arena is much greater.
Trustee 11: In terms of decision-making processes the public boards are much
more involved in the decision-making processes with management, and the
academic board is not involved in day-to-day type decisions. The current public
boards are much more involved in decision-making and input on the strategic
impact of day-to-day operations on the company. When you transition to the
academic board, you’re bringing that information. How do you protect the other
board members; how do you ask the right questions to management and protect
other board members. Kind of being the devil’s advocate for other board members
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in questions to management, to make sure board members are asking the right
question in case something happens like Penn State. The board is challenging
management asking for answers so the public board experience is valuable. If I
had not been on the public board I would not have perspective of what to ask.
Really management needs to protect the board to ask questions on behalf of the
board so the record reflects that in case something bad would happen.
Trustee 7: The decision making process is grueling when you're comparing an
academic to corporate board. Normally on the corporate board the votes come
hard and fast. And normally it's a unanimous because you are aligned as to where
the business is going. There is vigorous debate, but part of it is the size of the
board. You can’t have too much vigorous debate in a large group. So academic
decision-making is just not the same. It's slower, and it's probably not as clear-cut
as it would be in a corporation board. There is a lot more politics around academic
boards, certainly more than I expected. There is a lot more consideration of the
impact of that decision on the student body or the teacher body, which is normal. I
think the decisions are much slower on the academic side.
Trustee 8: On the academic side a lot more work is done the committee level in
the decision-making process than I've seen a in the corporate environment.
Committees will make recommendations, but there's a lot of debate and
sometimes dissension. The university environment even at the committee level
board members tend to defer to management and administration of the University
much more than you would see in a corporate environment. There is less risk for
board members, as they are not going to get typically sued. In a corporate level
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there's a lot of risk and pressure in the corporate environment. The corporate
environment if the board disagrees they are personally at risk, and they will stop
it. There's more direct involvement in the decision-making processes in a
corporate environment than what I see in an academic environment.
Trustee 1: The decision-making processes in a corporation and an academic board
are very similar. Both have executive committees, both have committees to
address important issues related to either shareholder value or the health of the
corporation or the mission, and finances of both the corporation and the
University board. They pretty much cover everything.
Trustee 3: In terms of decision-making, both types of boards, I’ll be very honest
with you, often have the work supposition that the leaders of the institution are
coming to the board with recommendations that are fully baked. There won't be
that much needed or the real robust questioning and prodding and revisiting the
dangers. They can fall into the trap of being inclined toward rubberstamping.
Where the quality of engagement goes up, is when the management team comes
to the board with the idea that is 80% baked and truly has teed up some options
for the last 20%. Asking for the board to help deal with that seems to get
engagement up, because people are not asked to rubberstamp it. There are some
pieces of it that they're asking for feedback on, sharing alternatives, and which
ways they are inclined toward. Even if they do that as a process step, the degree of
new engagement from the board would be quite high.
Trustee 4: Chairs are, in good corporate meetings, keeping board members
informed. Academic decision making on academic boards most of the decisions
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come through the executive committee, which is a function of board size at this
university. The executive committee meets monthly compared to quarterly for the
full board.
Board size.
Ning et al.’s (2010) study noted that since the 2002 Wall Street financial collapse,
corporate boards with fewer members, ranging from seven or less, increased in size,
while larger boards with 12 or more members, shrunk in size. This reversion trend in
corporate board size suggested that board independence and staggered board structure
may be linked to board size. The researchers concluded that based on agency theory,
there were costs when boards were too large, while resource dependency theory pointed
out that larger boards were beneficial in providing access to more external resources. The
participants in this study acknowledged that board size was a determinant in board
member participation, the number of committees needed on corporate versus academic
boards, and the ability to make decisions.
Trustee 10: You have to make sure you are reading the material. It is the old
20/80 rule, some people 20% are engaged, and 80% are not. Larger boards are
certainly unyielding, and there are a lot of committees, because we can get
something done. There are 11 committees on the academic board. There is an
executive committee. It doesn't meet very often because if it did meet often and
made decisions, which it is allowed to do, you don't need a board. A lot of trustees
would say, why are they there?
Trustee 6: Since the corporate board is smaller the work gets parsed out to fewer
people and there is more to do. On the corporate board I was on two committees.
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Those committees took up a lot of time and a lot of studying and work, not so
much in the academic board.
Trustee 9: The academic board has 40 members, and they meet four times a year
for approximately two and half hours. Comparing the corporate board to the
academic board, the size of boards has a dynamic application. At the academic
board, the majority of the work is done in the committees because of the size. The
committee meetings are three or four hours long. It would meet within a day or so
the full board meeting. The corporate board, because the size is so small you can
do more in-depth, hence the reason committees aren’t necessary.
Trustee 7: When I first started on the university board, there were only 15 on the
board. It has since grown over time. It's not as intimate as it was before. We use to
be able to have frank discussions as a board, and those are now more reserved to
the committees. You want to give everybody a voice and not everyone can have a
voice with 35 people at the table. Now that we've worked long enough together,
there's certain comfortableness in being able to have different discussions and
making points and counterpoints. The smaller board to me was better, but I don't
think it is realistic in a university. We had a hard time raising funds and for a long
time we were in the red. For last 10 years we have been in the black, and a lot of
it’s due to the board members.
Trustee 8: The size of boards has a big impact. In a group of 35, you can't have a
real discussion or debate. What I've found in my experiences at an academic
board, more of the work and decision-making is at the committee level. There are
more committees that are empowered by the board to make recommendations,

68

which are pretty much rubberstamped approval. The University also has an
executive committee of four members. The presiding religious head of the
university is the head of the executive committee. We just started it two years ago.
All the committee chairs sit on the executive committee, as does the chairman of
the board and the president.
Trustee 6: In terms of carrying out business, you need a smaller board in
corporate America; a large board is tough to coordinate schedules. It's unyielding
and difficult to get decisions made. In the academic board, there are very few
decisions to be made; most of the decisions are made for us. Most academic board
members are there for guidance, but not for real decision-making. Certainly the
chairman and vice chairman, the guys with the big bucks, get to make the big
decisions. It’s not the rank-and-file board member.
Trustee 2: I think size does matter if you had a board of 37 or 28 people trying to
run a publicly traded company. It would be very, very difficult to get things done.
If I had a bias, it would be toward a smaller corporate board. I think it would be
the bias of most CEOs. You rarely will find a publicly traded company with more
than 11 to 15 people normally that's the size. Academic boards are much larger,
and they usually have more committees, 10 to 11 committees probably closer to
12 committees. There's plenty of work to do in having a board of that size to give
you an opportunity to have a good selection of people that serve on usually 2 to 3
different committees.
Trustee 5: The trend to smaller corporate boards is the function of a couple things.
One is a supply issue. I think it's also people are finding that it is tougher to
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manage a larger board. You need to get concessions or alignment on various
issues, and as a practical matter it is harder to do that with 13 people versus nine.
There is a flipside to that you want to have enough diversity of view and
experience so that you don't always gravitate to alignment. It is not the healthiest.
You want some constructive friction; that is good governance. Constructive
friction on a board is healthy. It has to be constructive. You want that.
Simplistically, there is an inverse relationship between size and efficiency in
getting to a decision point in making decisions no doubt about that. But I think
certain entities like a university needs a larger board for other reasons. For matters
of policy and disclosure and those kinds of things, set up a process that allows you
to involve and communicate with the 50 people without the 50 people being
involved in the discussion of every matter is such a challenge. There’s ways to do
it, and it works well.
Maintaining Mission and Shareholder Value.
The oversight role of governance boards requires attention to the organization’s
mission and value creation. Earlier research conducted by Finegold et al. (2001)
examined the attributes needed to build and to engage effective corporate boards of
directors. The researchers concluded that the motivations for building more effective
boards were: to gain strategic advice; to secure resources; to manage crises; to help
develop leadership; and, to increase shareholder value. The researchers suggested several
methods of building effectiveness such as: define the board’s strategic priorities and
mission; determine the boards talent needs; annually assess the chief executive officer
and board members; remove ineffective board members; provide timely information to
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enable the board; allow time for the board to operate effectively; and, align director’s
interests with the board’s mission. The subjects in this study acknowledged many similar
recommendations for upholding the organization’s mission.
Trustee 10: The mission is great in both organizations, and it is very important
and so is branding. You have to protect it in the corporate environment. I was
saying the next two or three years and going forward that intensity is going to
increase in colleges. As we move forward, budgets, student enrollment, how do
you protect those at colleges. Their product is, in effect, a product and the
customer is a student. You have to protect what you put out there as a brand does
it have value? How do you determine what they are learning? Students that can't
get jobs? You have to ask yourself: is it government policies, is it what we're
teaching them, and is it not translatable? So, trying to protect that giving the
students some benefit when they leave here that they can support themselves.
Protecting the brand is important.
Trustee 6: Shareholder value is an issue at my organization. Shareholder meetings
were quite long, and it was a wild experience. Implicit in shareholder value is the
idea of a threat. You have activist shareholders. The atmosphere is different on
academic boards. It is much more laid-back. Our shareholders are really students,
and they don't come pounding on the door at a board meeting. Kids are passive.
There isn’t a sense of urgency like a corporate board.
Trustee 9: There are challenges of comparing corporate shareholder value and
commitment of mission. We talk about that often, as you can imagine. I’m on the
finance committee and when we’re approving budgets and spending capital
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expenditures for buildings and other types of things there is that natural tension
between to put up a rec center or to invest in a new program or college. So it’s a
good give-and-take; there is a balanced viewpoint particularly being a Catholic
University, mission is at the core of everything we do. We spend a lot of time
making sure. Every year, every committee spends a half-hour talking about our
mission and identity, so even if it’s a finance committee we anchor everyone back
to the core values of my university. At the finance committee, as I’m sure you’ve
heard, no margin – no mission, so if you’re not making money, you won’t be able
to fulfill your mission. It’s a continuing conversation. In the balance there are
priests on the board, so we have a core. They keep us focused, along with others,
who have different demographic backgrounds. It is a continuing challenge and
conversation that needs to be addressed regularly.
Trustee 6: Prove your value proposition. If you can't you won't get any money.
That's with the current topic of writings. They are all about if you can't prove a
way should the government give you money. Those types of restrictions make
you have to prove your proposition. With the corporation, the value proposition is
easier to prove - either you're making money or you're not. The stock’s going up
or it's not. It isn't subject to judgment either you’re doing something or you're not.
Academic boards have emotional attachments to the organization like we do at
my university. That doesn't exist in corporations. There is something inspiring in
the mission of a university. On campus we see the students walking around.
Companies aren’t doing that. Academic boards are not as bottom-line focus, so
we look at social justice, things that a company wouldn't think of.
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Trustee 11: Corporate boards in protecting shareholder value, I think the academic
side is actually better in protecting their mission. Corporate boards the minute it's
over your are preparing for the next board meeting, so there's a tremendous
amount of time tied up in federal regulations, SEC regulations, legal work and all
that preparation is a lot of nonproductive work. You're constantly involved in
board activities. Many of your decisions are short-term because you're protecting
shareholder value. Academic boards I think the mission of the university you
don't see that as a force on the public side. In addition to shareholder value, what
is the mission of this company? What else do we stand for? What do we
accomplish beyond profitability? What is the mission? How do we give back?
You never see it on public companies what do we give back to the community? I
was always disappointed with that, and I would try to incorporate that in the
corporate board. There isn’t a mission on the corporate side that I’ve seen. If we
do this – we are going to give back that. My university clearly has a mission. We
establish that these are the good things we are going to do. For example, taking
money and deploying it in a good way. That’s a good thing.
Trustee 7: In terms of value on academic boards, it is even more important as it
affects my own pocket as a donor. We talk a lot of about our mission of protecting
it. We never make a decision for instance in tuition increases and scholarship
allocations without mission at the front and center of all those decisions. There are
some difficult business decisions to make along the way, but especially on the
academic side, if you don’t have the mission clear, as to what it is you want to get
to, that’s a deficit.
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Trustee 8: Mission is the main difference between corporate and academic board,
and it is a continual challenge. We are a bit lucky. Of the 35 board members, eight
are religious, so they are always very good at bringing up the mission of the
institution, and how does it fit. Four years ago, we had our first strategic planning
session, and we put clear screens and filters for enhancing the mission and every
committee now uses that as a filter for every decision we make. How does it
affect the mission directly or indirectly? Are there unintended consequences of
some of these things around that question? For instance, one of our missions is to
serve the underprivileged and with the increased costs of education it is a difficult
thing to do. There is a relationship between the economics and the mission. If
you're healthy financially you can afford to fund the mission. If you're not healthy
financially, it's a barrier, and it makes it much more difficult to keep the mission
top of mind. There is some tie into what you are doing on a corporate board to
shareholder value and at a university. Strong enough financial wherewithal so that
it can fund its mission. I think universities have been living in a bubble for a long
time. The pressures around fees going up and people are questioning is it worth it
- getting a degree costing $200,000? What is the return on investment? The
external environment is changing, and it's going to require academic change much
more rapidly than they have in the past the next 10 years in the world of Higher
Ed. For example, technology: businesses have to deal with technology, and not
just for payroll systems, but technology influences the way people have to teach.
How do we preserve mission in online courses? These are very important strategic
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questions we are trying to get our heads around, and it will change the face of
Higher Education in the next five to 10 years.
Trustee 2: I think there's a lot of similarities to the corporate board in those
protections (mission and shareholder value), because they both have fiduciary
responsibilities. Both need to be fiscally responsible and that requires some
difficult decisions and balancing the budget. The cost of education continues to
grow, and it is the issue to deal with regards to unions and tenure. In universities
with tenure, there's issues with how do you make people transition when changes
need to be made and the need to be respectful. There are a lot of similarities
between the works of corporate and academic boards in each case there is a fiscal
responsibility, and secondly, there is a responsibility to protect the brand you can
call it mission, our brand, but it's very similar.
Trustee 3: In terms of protecting the mission like shareholder value, I think the
academic boards have the luxury of operating in supporting the fiduciary support
of the mission, and they can readily get all the viewpoints of the trustees. There is
freedom from legal liability and risk in things like that so people shy away today
from corporate boards because of all the corporate liability and risk. We don't
have that same thing in the University affiliation, but I think the key is to make it
a meaningful and engaged opportunity for the trustee. The more the trustee gets
out of it the more they're going to give back. Everything you can learn from the
feeling that you get from being supportive of the University and the mission,
which attracted you in the first place, and then the learning experiences, the new
content and engagement, things that you're interested in, where the university is,
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is the focal point of brain food. If we think of our core mission is to really
educate, making things affordable is a key. Nobody's leading the pack in
academia that I can see. Seeing how costs are going up faster than the CPI, and
we could be a leader in that. The University has great results and increasing
enrollment and increasing success in graduation rates, and so forth. It could be a
good dynamic to declare, which are annual goals in a year-end report.
Trustee 4: At my university the academic board's mission is to make it an
attractive university for students, which attracts high level and renowned faculty.
Trustee 5: The mission of our company is to save and sustain lives it is a
healthcare company and our products have a fundamental role in order to fulfill
the mission. Now you do it in the way that is sensitive to all the stakeholders and
of course you're going to do it in a way that is sensitive to your investors and
shareholders. So, we can give our products away for free in China and India, and
we would say this is saving more lives. But, we would go broke because of being
an unsustainable business model that would not generate acceptable returns. You
start with the fact that no single stakeholder is going to get everything they want. I
could increase my company's returns tomorrow if I would stop investing in R&D.
I would cut payroll benefits for employees, engagement and community types of
things, and we could drive earnings through the roof. The point is that it is not
sustainable. How do you recognize the interconnectedness of all the stakeholders?
I, we, start with our mission. How do we materially advance our ability to meet
the demands of all of our stakeholders - always with a view of fulfilling that
fundamental mission? I never want us to get too far away from that mission. We
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are a publicly traded company, and we have to meet the demands of our
shareholders no doubt. I believe long-term the best way to do that is to fulfill your
mission. Don't lose sight of the mission. In some ways I think the best public
companies when you think about it are not terribly different than nonprofits in
terms of what their purpose is and with their existence. That's what I believe. Now
a lot of people do not necessarily do that. But I think good companies that are
building sustainable enterprises get that purpose and mission of the enterprise
transcends everything. That is what I see is one of my fundamental purposes as
the CEO, as chief communicator is always reinforcing the mission.
Personal and Professional Rewards.
The motivation for board membership was examined by looking at the personal
and professional rewards described by the study participants. Research conducted by
Bowen (2008) identified several key components required to strengthen board
governance, such as understanding board partnership; recruiting board members for
effective leadership; investment of time and resources for good governance;
distinguishing nonprofit and for-profit board governance convergence; and, recognizing
the rewards of board governance in both sectors. The participants in this dissertation
expressed many personal and professional rewards in serving on corporate and academic
boards, and in some cases, they expressed their roles serving on academic boards were
more personally rewarding.
Trustee 10: In terms of the personal and professional rewards, you build personal
relationships and learn how to interact with others, deal with the egos to get things
done, particularly more so in the corporate environment than the college
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environment. The people on this academic staff, it amazes me that they do a lot
for not a whole lot not a whole lot of compensation, so there's a lot of labor of
love. To see things implemented, that's what it's all about. You can have the
greatest plans in the world, but if they're not implemented, it does not matter. To
see that come out in a corporate or college level, it's very satisfying, that's fun.
Trustee 11: In terms of personal and professional rewards starting with the public
board, is an excellent learning experience for someone going to work on an
academic board from my perspective. From working with lawyers and finance
people in the public board the requirements are very regimen. I think you learn
what you should be doing correctly, so there's a huge education process with
outside input from accounting firms and legal firms and other board members. I
would not have learned that if I'd only served on an academic board or in a board
of a small company that was not public. You get tremendous learning experience
being on a public company board.
Trustee 6: In terms of personal and professional rewards I feel good on both
situations if I feel I added something to the board. If my skill sets are used and
someone benefited from what I did, I can feel very fulfilled in either one. I am on
the academic committee, and that has kept me engaged. And at a recent board
meeting we had a discussion about combining business law and health. I've been
talking about this for six years, and we never really did it. We can't get the deans
to sit down and make it happen. In the corporate world that would never happen, I
would have, as CEO, made them work together and make it happen. You have to
make them see there's a gain there for everybody - that's how you get their buy-in
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and how you put change together like that. But, in academia, we put it in the
strategic plan and will do it one day, but not until we get those deans on board.
Trustee 8: On the business side it is more intellectually challenging to be a
corporate board member a lot more. You get more out of it that will help you
professionally, because it's business and you can learn things from it more
directly. It's not as personally rewarding as the academic board is, and we get a
little more frustrated with the bureaucracy, but when things move forward, it is
more personally rewarding. You do get some learning. You can learn anything
any time, so there is some learning benefits, but not as much as I did from the
corporate side.
Trustee 7: My personal rewards on the corporate board are just that it's my every
day, so it is just a fact of life. It's a business requirement. The academic side, it's
more gratifying than the corporate side, because you feel like you're contributing
something bigger that just than just running your own business. And I can see it as
I drive to the campus. I can see the progress over 12 years is almost
unrecognizable. It's vibrant with more buildings and the student body has grown.
You see students that are impacted by the scholarships and all that, and it's very
satisfying. In terms of personal rewards, to me the charity side is much more
rewarding than the business side, because I am in the middle level of my life and
career. It’s time to give something back. To me the corporate board is just
business as usual, and even if it wasn't just my board. The attraction there is
intellectual stimulation, right. But the economic part doesn't really play a role
anymore. It’s much more gratifying to be able to give your money, and your
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input, to an institution like a university. It has been very rewarding to me over the
years.
Trustee 1: My personal and professional rewards serving on these boards are a
great deal of satisfaction watching the growth and success, not just financially, but
in terms of mission and quality of the University, treatment of the students,
success rate of the students and growth in both the corporate and executive life. I
took a great deal of satisfaction from both.
Trustee 2: Personal professional rewards in terms of academic boards it's very
similar. The longer you serve on the board with individuals, the more rewarding it
will be because serving with individuals on a particular committee over time. In
three or four years you get to know the individuals and see them in action, how
they think, how they participate in exchange of ideas that you have with them,
break bread with them at lunch or dinner a number of times those relationships
develop. When that happens it's magical because that's when you really start
brainstorming about getting things you haven’t thought about. Let’s think about
doing it differently let's think out of the box. Corporate boards have
compensation, but less importance is on that than the importance of making a
contribution to the well-being of the company, to being a part of the work that
moves the company from this point to another point to be able to say during my
tenure on the board we saw our company go from so many billions of dollars in
revenue to double that. We improved shareholder value from X to three times X.
All participants on the board are goal driven people. They are self-starters.
Compensation is nice for some. It might be more important than others, but by
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and large my experience in 20 years on a corporate board, is the rewards are from
working with other executives that you grow to respect and appreciate. It helps
you as an individual to be a better mentor, to be a better leader, and a better
individual because you learn. It's a learning experience. You go there to
contribute, and they want to tap into your past experience from other boards or
running whatever company. But, as you come aboard, and you do that, you find
that you’re learning as much from the other folks at the table. It’s very refreshing
and very rewarding. You develop a camaraderie that is infectious, and it helps the
company and the culture of the company.
Trustee 3: In a corporate board people join it because of the prestige of being on
the corporate board, and it will be helpful to their career, and there is going to
have an economic incentive. There are boards that can cause you to lose money.
Boards that want you to invest money as a board member and in turn the stock
price doesn't go up. It is a risky proposition people have to think it through
carefully. I personally get more out of being on boards of younger companies that
are still private, or the management team is really trying to tap into the
capabilities of the board members they are bringing on. Jointly, the board and the
management team will help a company accelerate through growth. That's
exciting. It usually involves real upside. I think an academic trusteeship being a
wonderful conduit to bring brain food for the trustee is really valuable and
important. I do at my university both think of creating those experiencing
opportunities, whether a visit to Rome or my board is going to Paris with a
particular agenda for trustees and their spouses. Those are things that happen in
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invitations and opportunities during the year for people to get great exposure to
new knowledge and new learning. Now, being on a university board I think,
again, it comes down to quality caliber of your colleagues around the table.
Actually, I think being a trustee is much more rewarding at this stage in my
career. I’m not looking for a way to enhance my resume. I am much more
oriented toward entrepreneurial companies at the early stage of business activity
then in large corporation things that move slower.
Trustee 6: When you're on a corporate board you are a corporate guy, and that is
why you are asked to be on the corporate board. On an academic board you don't
necessarily understand education, how it's done, so there is a difference there.
Maybe if we were in the corporate world we would pound the table more. We had
a situation here at my university, with a subsidiary, for them to tell our CFO the
he could not sit in the meeting. We would never put up with that in a corporation.
The academic board put up with that.
Trustee 9: I think the expectations of board members are very similar on corporate
and academic boards. You want to provide guidance. You want to provide input
you want to share ideas. On the academic environment, it might be a little softer,
but there have also been times we’ve had budget issues that we’ve gone at it, and
you wouldn’t at a public company. I think there might be a little bit less legal and
fiduciary responsibility, but corporate board members today know they can be
personally liable and on the line so there is a heightened sensitivity. Now on
corporate boards, you have to make sure you’ve dotted every I and crossed every
T and asked every question, looked at every audit report, etc. I think that is how it
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should be. I think in academia that is still little less. At the end the day, they sit
back and think that it’s the CEO’s call. You can only push so far, but there are
certain things that I feel are out of my hands. New programming, closing colleges,
and opening colleges, so things are yielded to the folks that are running the
institution.
Trustee 4: The most important thing for me is that there is meaningful work on
academic boards. On my corporate boards I have the ability to influence diversity
as part of the agenda. I ran a capital campaign for the academic institution, and I
was very involved. I'm not the chair of a committee on the corporate board, so I
don't know if I have that level of work exposure required of chairs of committees.
Both the corporate and academic boards I am discussing have been very
rewarding to me personally and that hasn't been the case on other boards I've
served. At my present academic institution, I really get to contribute in
meaningful ways and that makes it very rewarding.
Trustee 5: I can say my fundamental motivation at my organization and my
motivation on the Board of Trustees are basically the same. I feel whatever talents
and capabilities I have, and limitations that I have, I derive meaning and
fulfillment by applying those to something that matters. So, if it's fulfilling our
mission of the healthcare company or providing an education that transforms the
students, the underlining drive is the same. It's why I do it. I don't feel it is a job. I
view it, to some degree, as being able to contribute something that really advances
the mission. It’s where I get the buzz, and it is the same on both boards. I am
lucky and I realize that I operate in healthcare industry is easier to do than if I was
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running other corporations that have to meet a market. I’ve been blessed in my
life to spend my life in two industries, healthcare and education, that are unique as
an economic good or unique in their intangibles. How do you put a value on
advancing health care put a value on advancing knowledge? They are intangible,
but priceless. My personal professional rewards change with your stage in life, as
you get older, and your life situation changes, it does allow you to do what you do
for the reasons I described earlier. I don't think you could find too many directors
of public companies that don’t serve on nonprofit boards. I attribute it to a lot of
things. People at a certain point their life have the time and interest to serve on
boards. One of the reasons they do that is because of their intellectual curiosity
the opportunity to be exposed to new people, new ideas, and new things. It
maintains an energizing for them. They recognize they have gifts and talents that
can be brought to the table to create value. I think they also take a step back and
look at that the context of a not-for-profit. The motivations are the same for me on
the corporate board and the academic board.
Trustee 11: If I had to pick, I like the academic board, and the longer-term nature
of the way it operates. It’s more similar to a private, small company. The public
company is not what it is made up to be.
Responses Related to Research Question Two: How do chief executive officers
perceive corporate board governance influences academic board governance? Four
themes were identified: 1. Corporate Influences; 2. The Great Divide; 3. Academic
Lessons, and 4. Best Practices.
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Corporate Influences.
The study participants described several corporate board practices that academic
boards could incorporate such as more focus, discipline, and clearer expectations. In
research conducted by Baird (2006) on effective governance culture, the author looked at
corporate and participatory board structures. The researcher examined processes to
improve the credibility and consistency of internal governance controls in academic
institutions. The impetus was to encourage a culture of continuous improvement.
Trustee 6: Corporate boards are much more focused. All boards have problems
with this. They set up an agenda, and they set up the same agenda and same
reports instead of focusing on what is really important. Our recent academic
governance task force looked at this, but we slid right back into what we were
doing. Corporations have influenced academic boards in terms of metrics looking
at the outcomes, all that is coming from corporations. Most good companies run
like that, so if you see a push for that, it is coming from corporate board members.
Trustee 10: Quite honestly in a corporate board meeting monthly really got people
on board and, quite frankly, colleges don't do that. There is one thing when you
run a board a particularly a college board. People may not be very familiar with
everything that goes on. You need to be prepared when you're given information
read it. To be honest with you, we get a lot of trustees that don't read it all. Read it
so you are prepared. If you really don't have a grasp of something, take that as an
opportunity to keep your mouth shut. A lot of trustees don't. They'll express an
opinion that may not be well founded or well researched. That comes up from
time to time, and it can send you off in a tangent. Compared to corporate boards
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when you meet monthly, the volume of material is not huge. In a corporate world
directors will call you or you invite them to do that, and it is not unreasonable to
have a weekly call from one of them. I have not witnessed that on the academic
board.
Trustee 7: That's part of what the other boards have members that brought to the
academic board is a discipline of measurement on the planning side of it. I think
that academic boards are similar to the corporate boards, but they don't do it as
such a way that is disciplined. They don't have the same discipline as a corporate
board has. I would like to see more of it, but that's my corporate side speaking. I
like to have, for example, more specific succession planning in place. I would like
to have more specific budgets in place. I would like to see a capital plan in place
as to what we are going to be doing in five years. I do think in the next 5 to 10
years academic boards are going to have to get more disciplined. It is going to get
a lot tighter to make break even, or make a profit on it. The rules are changing.
Academic boards are much more in tuned to the student or in other words to their
customer. They are much more modern thinking toward their customer, and they
have daily customer interaction. Corporations don't have it. From a technology
standpoint academic institutions are much further ahead than in any corporation
I've seen. In terms of board member expectations comparing corporate and
academic by donating your money in the academic board, you have some skin in
the game. That does give me the ability to feel like my views are heard. On the
corporate side, those board members feel that they have to contribute because
they are getting compensated. They try to be helpful with opinions. It translates
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directly to the academic board, we all give input with the best intentions in mind
so this pretty much parallels.
Trustee 8: For board members that I've been around, the expectations are much
clearer in a corporate board. I have never ventured into a corporate board meeting
that the members were not well prepared. They read the pre-read, they do their
homework, and they are engaged. In an academic side, you get a lot people who
do not do their homework. They come to the meeting. Some of this I believe is a
result of the size. People think they're there to give back, as opposed to being
passionate about it. On a corporate board, people are doing it for a specific reason.
They're more incentivized to take it professionally and do the work. On the
academic side, half the board members are really engaged and prepared for the
meeting, and I have never seen that kind of lack of preparation on the corporate
board level. I don't think it's a function of being compensated on a board for the
time they give, and for the knowledge and experience they bring. They don't get
paid that much. I think it's less about compensation and more about the risk and
their own personal brand image. To have problems as a board member that would
reflect that I'm not doing my job. It is a fear of my name being linked to
something going wrong. In a university, you don't have those kinds of risks, that's
why you don't get that kind of attention, so it has little to do with compensation.
Trustee 1: I think there is a greater influence on finances and the mission of the
University, social responsibility, and the experience of the corporate board
members can be lent to the academic board members in these areas. And, our
university had some serious financial troubles, before we had a leadership change.
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And, frankly, the board did not previously do a good job of auditing those
problems and fixing those problems. It has since been corrected. There is a
continuing focus on finance and basic mission on both corporate and academic
boards. That's a maturation process. My corporate board experience has been very
rewarding and has assisted me in serving on the academic board in all the
experiences that I've had and in the knowledge that I've gained. The academic
board needs good stewards. They have to know what to look for and be sure that
the bases are being covered. Financial growth of the University, enrollment,
student life, and the mission of the University, the corporate experience really can
help you to evaluate those factors.
Trustee 3: Corporate boards will often have influence by having an academic on
their boards so that culture begins to comingle and add value to each other. The
big thing that is different is the clarity of the goals and the rigor and monitoring
progress against them between the two boards. The other big thing is that there is
great prestige on a big board and that matches your collegial interactions; the
quality of who is at the table is very important.
Trustee 5: The not-for-profit and universities sectors historically have not had the
same kind of discipline and defined process and rigor, but that's changing quickly
for the better. You see a big distinction in a practical manner, that you can't get
away from, is a director of a public company is a paid position. It's not why
people serve, generally speaking, although some do, it is almost as if it's because
it's a volunteer. It is never articulated this way. It is my observation that many
participants on not-for-profit boards, it is almost as if I do not have to have the
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same degree of rigor and commitment because after all it's not paid. I'm not sure
many people process it consciously that way, but that doesn't mean it doesn't
exist.
Trustee 9: Going back to the thought that a good majority of the people on the
academic board come out of the corporate world, at very senior levels, is one of
the many reasons the university wants them on the board, to bring their
knowledge and expertise into the university. I am confident that it’s had a huge
impact over the years and particularly in terms of Catholic and religious
universities that have gone to lay boards and lay presidents. For example, at Notre
Dame when they went from Holy Cross priests to a lay board you can trace back
the way they are operated today to the corporate people that influenced that
structure.
Trustee 11: My academic board has a lot of the format of a corporate board.
Overall, corporate governance influences academic governance in that the
governance exists in corporations. I've given a lot of input into setting up my
university’s governance structure from my public side experience.
The Great Divide.
The study participants noted several differences in the governance practices of
corporate and academic boards. The comments were consistent with Rytmeister’s (2009)
observation that academic boards lacked professional processes, as some participants
noted the lack of rigor and board member preparedness on academic boards.
Trustee 7: The politics of the two boards are really different. On the academic
board, there's a social politic that isn't there in a corporate board. What I mean by
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that is that you have to have a relationship with the president and the staff
member beyond just the board meetings, because, you want them to open up to
you if we have trouble. The regulations are completely different on an academic
board because of government funding involved.
Trustee 10: They are different animals no question about it and you have to mix
the two when you can. You can't force something on one or the other. It has to be
applicable. The business plan, in terms of corporate boards is an annual event a
three-year outlook, but it rolls. I don't think colleges do as great a job as they can
on that. Putting the plan on the shelf once you do it, doesn't do any good. It needs
to be looked at periodically and when you're doing your projections whether
quarterly, semiannually, annually. You need to go back and look at it. What did
we say we were going to do? I do think colleges can do a better job with meshing
that projection and reporting process.
Trustee 11: On the academic board, we are not spending three months preparing
for the next board meeting at least the board members are not. In those meetings,
we are looking for longer-term visionary activities, where we going for longer
term thinking and direction. I prefer the academic board because it's really how
public board should be run but with all the shareholder activists and regulations it
makes it impossible. It is counterproductive and difficult to look longer than in
longer strategic planning mode. Those are the two major differences between
academic board and a corporate board.
Trustee 10: Historically, college CEOs have not been held to an identifiable
performance level. That's changing; historically that was not the case. It's not a
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bottom-line institution. It is if it is in the red, you have a problem. There isn’t that
huge excitement that you would in the corporate world. That's changing today,
but those are things were different and colleges are catching up to those areas
now. For trustees, it is a voluntary job, drawing trustees can be difficult when
colleges are having problems, or they bail out and that makes it very tough on the
president.
Trustee 3: There is freedom from legal liability and risk in things like that so
people shy away today from corporate boards, because of all the corporate
liability and risk.
Trustee 11: The public board expectations are much more sensitive to legal and
federal laws. They are very sensitive to that. That is not the case on the academic
side. In a private school, they don't have to be driven by the federal laws that are
placed on a public company, so the boards have very different expectations.
Corporate boards have a lot of personal liability. On the corporate side there is
about $100 million P&L insurance. They're worried about getting sued, and we
don't worry about that so much on the academic side. They are getting advised by
a law firm for the company management, and the board actually has another legal
firm to protect themselves. Public boards are very sensitive to shareholders, classaction lawsuits, environmental lawsuits, SEC security violations, because they all
have inside information. On the public board, they are going to make a six-figure
income being a public board member, and with that a tremendous amount of
responsibility and accountability and a lot of legal issues on a public board.
Versus the academic board – you are not being paid. You try to make long-term
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decisions for the institution, and you really don’t worry about being sued or
violating a federal or securities law.
Trustee 10: What you can take away from corporate boards is there is a degree of
liability, particularly on the corporate side, that you have to be aware of because if
somebody messes up, it can get very expensive even with liability insurance that
may not be enough. Colleges have it too, but it’s not as serious.
Trustee 4: A good example is the academic boards have an investment committee
that is led by outside professionals in the field, and you won't find that in a
corporate environment. Academic boards have an executive committees and the
corporate board I serve on does not have an executive committee. That might be
attributed to size, the corporate board has approximately 12 people, and the
academic board has 50 people. Academic boards also have an executive session
without the CEO and that has not been the tradition in the corporate boardroom.
Corporate boards have strategic retreats, though you have to be careful on who is
invited beyond board members in order to maximize teambuilding and
relationship building.
Trustee 5: At every board meeting there is an executive session with me without
management and without me. That's a best practice. We will get there overtime at
the academic board. The board must have time to talk about itself from time to
time without the CEO. It doesn't have to be every meeting, but it's just healthy. I
encourage it. The challenges when you're somebody running an organization, you
have to be able to step back and let your board apply proper governance. They
always have to be viewed and balanced with the mission. I think the public sector
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companies could learn from non-for profit and academic institutions in that sense.
We don't have a committee for example at my organization on the mission, like
saving and sustaining lives. But, could we do more to provide access to lowercost therapies medicines, devices that in some way broadens access. It may not
generate the same relative profitability as mature markets, but it still generates an
attractive return of capital. It may be, if we had a committee report on oversight
and mission, we could do even more than we do now in that area. That's a
tangible example of what I'm trying to say. We have our mission and identity for
the university that strengthens the mission.
Leadership: Board Chair Inside or Outside.
The practice of corporate boards being led by inside or outside chairmen was
another difference from the establish practice of academic boards being led exclusively
by outside chairmen as described in these mixed opinions.
Trustee 10: I've only experienced outside chairs in my life. Banking was kind of
an anomaly; we always had an outside chair. That's just plain good governance as
it gives the separation of powers. If there is one thing, I mentioned egos. If CEOs
can get big heads, because things are going well until they don't. That's when
everyone in the board looks at each other and says who's working with this
person? That's why an outside chair is good. You communicate with that person
daily if that person is doing their job. Maybe in some cases in my cases, daily on
the drive home I would talk to my outside chair that way you're also protected.
I'm a believer, and separation of CEO and chairman that's all I've known.
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Trustee 6: Many have an outside chairman. My organization had it that way and
others do. It is becoming more common, and I like it much better. It's much better,
and I do think that the academics are ahead of the game doing it that way.
Trustee 9: The role particularly in banking more and more there are more outside
chairman. We went to that three or four years ago. It came off the financial crises,
and the regulators are pushing pretty hard for that separation between in-house
people and external people. I think it makes sense in the academic institutions
because that person would typically bring a different perspective and not running
the day-to-day operation. I’m still not sold that it makes sense in the corporate
arena, but it’s also the reality of the regulatory environment. It is very prominent
in financial services. I don’t know how prominent it is outside financial services.
Trustee 11: I believe you should have a chairman that is outside the company.
Where there is chairman and CEO, I would automatically recommend that a lead
director be appointed by the board. I am personally in favor of separating the two
roles.
Trustee 1: The chair of corporations is usually an insider, as opposed to academic
chairs being on the outside. That system my personal opinion is that if there are
appropriate checks and balances and the insider is the best choice for the CEO,
rather than a total outsider, because as a total outsider you don't know what they
know about the business, of nuances the intricacies as an insider who grows up
with the company knows all the nuances. I see that increasingly in business they
recruit outsiders who are either presidents or CEOs of other companies. Which
tells me that there is a basic lack of management development in a lot of the
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companies today in America, which disturbs me. In the academic model, the
chairman is outside the University, because they have the commitment to the
university and the basic life experiences that can help them run any big business.
They have an appreciation for the mission, and the student health, and life of the
University, as well as finance. They are well prepared, and it acts as a check and
balance on the president and CEO.
Trustee 4: I like the idea of outside executive chairs it works well at the corporate
level.
Trustee 2: Corporate boards are chaired by internal people and academic boards
are chaired by outside people. These are two different beasts. It makes sense to
have a corporate board chair that is run by individuals inside a company, although
as we've seen in the past 10-15 years, the public watchdogs have sought that the
board be led by an outside director. They prefer to not have the CEO be the
Chairman. Corporate governance has followed the advice of these outside groups
that looked at the running of companies and felt that it was in the shareholder's
best interest to separate the two titles. Some companies have a lead director.
Otherwise the inside guy’s salary and everything is predicated on the running of
the company, and outside directors aren’t truly carrying out their responsibilities.
This avoids the image of being rubber stamped on the inside. In the old days
many met board members who were country club members and friends of the
CEO. It goes on to some extent now, but it still protects the shareholders’ value
by having an outside chair. I would say today most Fortune 100 companies have
the title separated. I think that's a good thing. In the case of an academic board it's
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a little different. At my academic institution the board has responsibility to be as
supportive as possible to the president to carry out the mission. The chairman of
the trustees has an extraordinarily important role in assessing how the president is
doing and assessing what help she may need. There may be some areas that that
person is very strong in, and other areas that are not her strengths. That’s where
the chairman comes in and makes sure to best provide more support in some
areas.
Trustee 5: At my corporation, we have an outside lead director. I serve as both
CEO and chairman there is an increasing trend to separate the chair and CEO
roles, as I am sure you've seen in the literature there are pros and cons to that.
That is the only model in Europe. Not so much in the US, but if you have a
combined role like we do at my organization without exception you have a lead
director. We have a lead director position that really serves as a nonexecutive
chair.
Trustee 7: In terms of having the chairman of firm inside the company, I think the
corporate culture inside a business really is critical as for most of them fail.
Trustee 9: The separation of chairman and CEO I think it's a good thing it's just
good governance. There is a big trend in business to separate those two roles, and
it's just a great thing even though I didn't personally have a good experience with
my chairman it is just good governance. It provides a good balancing act between
those two roles, especially in today's business environment. The chairman has to
have separation from the day-to-day activities of the business. It's a healthy thing.
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Academic Lessons.
The study participants identified several practices that academic boards have
established that could be adopted by corporate boards. The comments made supported
Feyerherm’s (2009) proclamation that the academic board approach to board membership
utilizing a co-learning model was unique to corporate boards. Gee (2006) supported
Feyerherm’s position by noting that university presidents, like their corporate
counterparts, were responsible for managing their organizations. Gee defined the unique
difference between the two structures was that academic presidents govern through
powers of persuasion and collaboration, a theme reinforced by this study’s participants.
Trustee 10: I think colleges are pretty good at shared governance for the most
part. That could be given some consideration in the corporate world, although in
the corporate world directors hire somebody to run the company and expect that
person to run the company. They didn't want to mess with that for the most part.
You can find in colleges were the president might be over helped sometimes by
trustees, and I've been a strong believer in if somebody overstepped the bounds,
we have to remind them we hired this person to run the college and let them come
back to us if you don't like it, then vote on it. The shared governance could
perhaps leak in the corporate world a little bit.
Trustee 9: Academic board practices that corporate boards should adopt, in
general, the mission and branding piece could certainly translate into businesses
as well. For the most part businesses will do guiding principles vision and
mission, particularly being involved in a religious institution as we talked earlier
that is always at the core in businesses. We will anchor back to the efficient, but I

97

think it is more focused on the profitability and driving that inherently is having a
sound brand and great reputation. The continued focus around what are, we in
business, for beyond the shareholders and the customers, but what about the
employees and communities. Actually, we’ve tried to focus a fair amount on that.
I think the academic boards to a better job, and on business development and
capital campaigns. On a regular basis, the board members are being involved and
engaged personally and in terms of helping raise money. The correlation to that
on the corporate side, I don’t think we ask enough of our board members to help
develop to our business. They are all well connected. I think it may be
preconceived as taboo, but typically we are doing business with them personally
and their companies. Obviously the people are large-company CEOs that have
lots of vendors and contacts and networks. I don’t think we have tapped that.
Especially in big companies board members of Fortune 500 companies have
board members from all over the country in the world. They fly into per two days
of meetings they fly out again. They focus on their responsibilities as a director
and their committees. It could be extremely valuable for the company, if the 10
directors referred two very attractive business pieces per year and that would be
attractive to the shareholder. We have a lot of our employees on not-for-profit
boards, and we provide a four-day session of the responsibilities of being on a
nonprofit board what are the expectations. The world has gotten more complex
and complicated so you can’t just show up and say now what do I do. We teach
the roles responsibility. I sat in on one. I sat on nonprofit boards for 30 years. It
may not make sense to teach in the undergraduate or MBA level. Taking it to a
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corporate level makes a lot of sense particularly as people are coming back later
in life especially in executive education programs.
Trustee 8: Corporations could look better at mission and branding. Financial
results and returning value to shareholders over what period of time, today's
business environment is about today, this month, this quarter, this year. You can
make some shortsighted decisions. Universities do good job at mission and
branding and taking a longer-term view of the art. Better with long-term value.
Trustee 10: Corporate people realize an academic organization was a different
animal. When you set up a course, you can't cancel it the following month. You
may have to run it for three years to see if people go through the cycle. It takes a
while for corporate people to see that colleges have a time flow that corporations
do not tolerate, they cut and go. Colleges don't. That is something from the
corporate standpoint. They bring their ideas in, and they have to find a mixture so
to speak.
Best Practices.
Corporate Processes. All the Trustees described the influence of corporate board
experience was apparent on the academic boards they served. The participants
acknowledged that the majority of the members of academic boards they served were
employed in the corporate world, consistent with Larcker and Tayan’s (2011) research
that CEO level experience was desirable in board members. The participants described
the reason for this phenomenon was due to the fact that academic boards sought member
attributes of philanthropic means, in addition to leadership and a prominent position in
the community.
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Trustee 10: When I look at the corporate involvement on the academic board,
which is significant. They don't need to do this, but when they get involved, you
have to prove to them their value. It is up to the president to do, and if they don't
do that, they will lose interest, and you will lose them. You have to do it fairly
quickly, and they will put their heart in it.
Trustee 8: There are a couple of areas that academic boards are behind corporate
boards and one is talent management and succession planning, and the other is
compensation approach. They're both related. Corporations today are monitoring
a much better job than they were 10 years ago, especially succession planning for
the president the senior level positions. Universities are way behind on that, they
think people are going to stay in those positions until they die or physically and
mentally unable to perform their duties. There is a much longer-term cycle in a
university than in a corporation. Being great instructors for young people and
teaching the next generation how to be great leaders and individuals, we are
struggling as a board to try to figure out how do you deal with compensation and
tenure in a marketplace that you need tenure to compete and attract the right
talent, but too much of it is no good. Those are two areas (succession planning
and performance pay) are starting to dig into on the academic side. A lot of it is
driven because our corporate board members and me have had to deal with that in
the corporate world, and we are bringing that to the academic board. I tell my
president you are running a big business with a huge budget, and you're dealing
with the same issues that a CEO of a business runs in to. You may not want to
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admit this publicly, because of mission and values, but you're running a business,
and it is fact.
Trustee 3: The academic board sometimes is not clear what the annual goals are
and corporate boards are. This year we are going to grow by X amount, we are
going to improve our profitability by certain amounts, and increase customer
base, and new product introduction, whatever. Progress is tracked against a goal. I
personally think that academia could be a lot more cost efficient.
Trustee 5: There is a convergence of the two types of governance and the reason
is the underlying issues are the same, right. Each entity has stakeholders of which
directors or trustees have this very fundamental obligation or responsibility. It's
just that in the corporate world, there is a shareholder in the traditional sense, but
the traditional shareholder is one of multiple stakeholders of a company.
Ultimately, the traditional shareholder in the University is no different. You have
this array of stakeholders, and when you think of this in a fundamental and
simplistic way, there isn't a big difference in responsibilities, which is why you
see this convergence. I don't think you could find too many directors of public
companies that aren’t involved in at least one or numerous not-for-profit
organizations in the community.
Trustee 2: Academic boards to some extent have already adopted many the
corporate practices. There is a separation of governance and utilization of
committees. I'm not certain there are any corporate governance practices that
academic board should adopt. I can see how things that we had done at my
corporate board have helped me as a trustee of the academic board. I made
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recommendations. There are certainly best practices and best in class ideas that
are done on corporate boards that can be passed on to the academic board and
vice versa. From the University standpoint they are more apt to rely on outside
consultants in brainpower and on campus for a particular problem. They're more
willing to do that than publicly traded companies. From time-to-time you have to
bring in outside firm who specializes in a particular area just like search, that's
what they do. Some companies aren't willing to look at outside consultants in that
manner. At my university they were more willing to seek outside experts when
help is needed.
Trustee 4: Another caution I would like to discuss is that there's a trend now for
corporate boards to seek board members from global companies and locations. I
think we need to be cautious about that because what makes a corporate board
have a strong team is the fact that you're seeing people locally more than six times
a year. You're seeing them at other functions in the city that you live. You'll see
them on other boards. You build a relationship so that when it comes time to
speak up in a board meeting you have a comfort level that these are people who
really know each other. The threat here is if you have people flying in globally six
times a year for only the meeting, you never have that opportunity to bond with
them as individuals. I see that as a threat for governance in general. Academic
boards should be cautious when they have board dinners with a cast of thousands
as that affects the ability of the academic board to build a team. For instance the
corporate dinners may have speakers from a specific group at the board dinner,
but it's never more than the board members and those people, so you have a group
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of 20. In a small board dinner, you really can ask specific questions and
understand the topics and get to know each of the board members individually. I
think corporate boards are leading diversity initiatives and academic boards do
not have that level of commitment at this time.
Trustee 6: Expectations of academic board members are far fewer than corporate
boards. There are so many people on academic boards to rely on, which you do
not have on a corporate board. For instance I've been on this board nine years, and
I was never asked to be a chair of the committee. I would've done it. I'm perfectly
okay, but I would've done it.
Term limits.
There were no corporate terms limits reported by the study participants though
most publicly traded organizations have moved to the annual reelection of all directors,
which contrasted to the common practice of academic boards enforcing term limits, often
to three or four terms. The practice of enforcing term limits was described by some of the
participants as a risk to good governance due to longevity signaled institutional
knowledge gained over time.
Trustee 9: There were no term limits, and we are putting in more expectations of
board members. The members tend to know when the time has come to leave the
board. Because it's not a public board, some people like that because there isn't
the fiduciary responsibility, but other people may feel that it's more cosmetic then
a full-fledged legal board. There are some legal responsibilities of the sort, but
certainly not near the public board responsibilities. If they're participating
providing input, attending the meetings, helping us get connected in the
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community, then the continuity provided by no term limits can be good. If they're
not doing that, then we both have to come together and say this probably isn't
meeting both of our expectations.
Trustee 10: The average corporate directors stayed 10 to 11 years and this was all
men, before the days that we really looked for diversity. There really wasn't a
need to have limits. They took themselves off the board if the time came. For the
academic board, term limits and age limits are a three-year term and every three
years and the Trusteeship Committee looks at those people and approaches them
to stand for reelection. Colleges are not really good at evaluating trustees so to
speak. We all talk to do better and send out forms, but in my experience we never
asked somebody not to run again. They can run for three-year terms until they
reach the age of 75.
Trustee 1: Today corporate governance is dictating that board members be
reelected every year. Age 72 is about an average for term limits.
Trustee 8: On the academic board, there are four-year terms. You can serve three,
four-year terms. You can renew after the 12 years. You could step off for a least a
year and come back, and that's been a pretty normal practice. There are no age
limits. Tenure and experience in the chair and vice chair are very important
things. You don't want to be shortsighted in terms of term limits continuity and
history is an important thing.
Trustee 3: The corporate board did not have term limits or age limits there is
dialogue now about possible age limits. For example, a former Secretary of State
decided once the company went public he wanted to move to an emeritus, so that

104

he did not have the liability of somebody making accusations toward his age. In
terms of the implementation of academic board term limits, I don't know how
good that it's going to be. It seems to me that if you have a hard rule like that, and
you're going to take some people from very involved and supportive, and then tell
them now you're off you just can't expect the same level of involvement support
from them. They will have other things that will fill that space. And so I am
worried about what that term limit thing will do actually. There's always the issue
of people just hanging on and taking slots, but that can be handled in a more
flexible way by simply asking people if they really want to continue. I think a lot
of times they will read into the question that they need either step it up or come
off. What you're trying to get with term limits is keeping it refreshed and
committed without the hard rule that could cause you to lose great support.
Trustee 4: In terms of age limits, we have to be cautious on both academic and
corporate boards because the longer people serve, and if they're very good they
gain institutional knowledge, which takes time to acquire. I served a four-year
honorary term. I think most of that was for people to be able to rub elbows with
celebrities like former members of a presidential cabinet. At my present academic
institution, I really get to contribute in meaningful ways and that makes it very
rewarding.
Trustee 5: My corporate board has stated age limits, which is 72. One of the
biggest challenges, particularly in large public companies, is a supply of
experienced directors. What you are seeing here is a couple of trends. One is
people are raising their age limits and getting away from each limits altogether.
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They are saying there is a whole pool of people above the age of 72 with
wonderful experience that we should tap into, that would be great contributors to
the company. Because we have this guideline, the age limit, they are no longer
eligible. The other trend you see is the size of boards. Our board has 13 directors,
and I am the only management director. In today's world, that is somewhat large.
You are seeing a trend toward smaller boards.
Conclusions
The world of governance has certainly changed since the passing of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002. This research attempted to bridge the gap of knowledge on the
convergence of corporate and academic governance with this descriptive case study
encompassing the opinions of the participants themselves. Oxholm (2005) examined the
implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and noted that the regulation did not
apply to institutions of higher education. The author emphasized that the intent of the Act
was consistent with the aspirations of academia and recommended that colleges and
universities adopt best practices from the Act to improve transparency and accountablity
within and outside higher education. Supporting this position, Gee (2006) suggested that
the Act imposed challenges for all management groups including volunteer boards in
higher education, as it provided a model of best practices for financial responsibility and
the importance of designating proper fiscal authority within corporations. It was no
surprise to this writer that many of the participants in this descriptive case study linked
their corporate governance accountabilities to their role in academic governance, as the
Act has been in force for more than a decade and this particular cohort of CEOs were
properly schooled.
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The lack of professionalization was observed on academic boards and cited by
Balch (2008) who asserted that trustees have an important role as mediators and leaders
in the academic community. Balch suggested that academic trustees interject more
corporate-like governance attributes to academic governance in order to professionalize
governance. Balch’s recommendations supported the research goals of this project in
terms of gaining new information by soliciting the perceptions of CEOs serving on
corporate and academic boards.
The rich text of the content provided by the words of the CEOs in this qualitative
case study contributed to the validity of the study. In every response, the CEOs provided
both context and confirmation of their statements and opinions. In summary, the analysis
of the interviews with the CEOs serving as academic trustees revealed several areas of
variances between the two governance models related to: making decisions and member
preparedness; mission and shareholder value; and personal and professional rewards,
which directly correlated to the research questions of this study.
•

CEOs described the decision making process on the academic board as laborious
and untimely. They also noted that corporate board decisions are focused on
short-term results, as opposed to academic board decisions focused on long-term
strategies.

•

CEOs noted that corporate board members were better prepared for board
meetings in terms of having a firm knowledge of the pre-read materials.

•

CEOs admitted that corporate board membership accompanies greater personal
financial risk, along with financial rewards of compensation in contrast to
academic boards that are unpaid and seek member donations.
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•

CEOs recognized that academic boards have not adopted strategic planning
processes and succession planning protocols that are prominent oversight
concerns of corporate boards.

•

CEOs appreciated the academic boards commitment to the mission of the
institutions and participants suggested that corporations adopt a focus on mission.

•

CEOs called out that academic institutions were amenable to utilizing outside
experts or consultants more readily than corporations. This deferring to experts
was considered positive management of issues.

•

CEOs described academic use of technology more advanced than in corporations.

•

CEOs explained their academic board service as more personally rewarding than
their corporate board service.

The study revealed several areas of alignment between the two governance models in
terms of board membership and member selection, motivation for service, and the
utilization of skills.
•

CEOs remarked that both the corporate and academic boards relied on board
member recommendations for gathering a pool of potential board candidates, as a
primary method of recruiting new members.

•

CEOs appreciated the mental stimulation of utilizing their skills for service on
both corporate and academic boards.

•

CEOs reported serving on corporate and academic boards enhanced their
professional personae.

•

CEOs inferred that the quality of their constituencies on the boards contributed to
the prominence of their service.
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Implications and Recommendations
The best practices of board governance have been identified for expanding
knowledge within the Academy from the viewpoint of the insiders, whose physical board
work remains conducted behind closed doors. This study provided a glimpse into this
important social construct. It is routine for corporate board members to serve on
academic boards creating undeniable influence from corporate boards to academic
boards. While many similarities were observed between the two governance models, the
board members, as study participants, also discussed many distinctive differences. This
researcher identified these areas outside the margins as learning opportunities.
The CEOs asserted that meaningful work was crucial to their participation on the
board. The participants agreed that terms limits on either academic or corporate boards
risked the loss of institutional knowledge and commitment to the organization by a lack
of continuity that time allows. The level of expertise required for corporate board
membership was reported to be critical for corporate boards, as opposed to ideal in
academic boards. The participants reported that academic boards also sought members
with the financial means to support the institution, which was a criteria not reported for
corporate board membership. These contrasting specifications for board membership
criteria are areas seasoned for future quantitative research. None of the study participants
offered knowledge or experience in higher education as criteria for academic board
membership.
Gee (2006) acknowledged that academic culture is not wedded to the financial
results that dominate corporate culture, and the business leaders particpating in this study
accepted that they had considerably greater personal liability and legal consequences on
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the corporate boards than academic boards. The CEOs appreciated the importance of
building personal relationships among other board members in order to be comfortable
asking tough questions in board meetings for both academic and corporate roles.
Relationship building was considered essential to strengthening governance. Corporate
board members reiterated that there were clearer expectations of corporate board
members more than academic board members. These are several areas that academic
boards need to focus on in order to improve their governance responsibilities.
Academic board members appreciated that their institutions had a clear
commitment to their mission, which board members respected and reported lacking in
comparison to their corporate organizations. Many participants expressed their work on
the academic board was more rewarding than the corporate board. A specific example
extracted from the interviews was that Academic boards have Investment Committees of
outside experts to protect the organizational assets, a practice described as unseen in
corporate organizations. The data also identified that Academic institutions appreciated
the expertise of outside experts or consultants at an observed level not found in corporate
organizations. The use of technology in academic institutions was considered superior to
corporate organizations, and it was noted that academic board members lacked
preparedness for meetings in contrast to corporate board members being well-prepared.
For future consideration, corporate boards would benefit from asserting a mission
to the organizational goals, retaining strong board members without term limits,
considering outside consultants for their expertise, and by utilizing an Investment
Committee of community experts. Academic boards would benefit from exerting clear
expectations for board members, implementing strategic planning, succession planning,
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and more corporate-like professionalization board practices. Both corporate and academic
boards need to ensure board members have meaningful work to utilize their skills and
expertise to improve board member engagement.
The Academy is known for educating generations of students, so it is a perfect
institution to take up the cause of educating board members. Corporate governance
academies are well established across the USA. There are corporate board governance
programs offered at Harvard, Yale, the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of
Business, Stanford University, the University of Chicago, Northwestern University,
Dartmouth, Columbia, Duke, and UCLA, Andersen School of Management to name a
few. They are supplemented by an equally robust list of professional organizations
dedicated to education and training programs on corporate governance. However, this
writer could not locate a single college or university program devoted to higher education
academic board member education and only two professional organizations offering
educational programs for four-year institutions of higher education and their academic
boards members: The Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities
(AGB) and The American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA). The time is ripe for
the Academy to step up and invest in the education and professionalization of academic
board members whose decisions impact the financial and reputational risk management
of the academic enterprises across the country and around the world. This disparity in
educational opportunities between corporate and academic governance whether real or
perceived, is an area of concentration recommended for future research, and in particular,
action.
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This researcher’s final thoughts reflect back to the beginning of this research
quest. The author was unable to uncover research linking the convergence of corporate
and academic boards similar to the focus of this descriptive case study. That exploration
began an odyssey into the untapped depth of knowledge generously delivered by chief
executive officers who served as academic trustees. The themes that were exposed during
the interviews with the CEOs offered a plethora of governance practices that were
described as idyllic, worrying, or steadfast. Given the heightened interest in the work, the
role, and the responsibilities of governance boards, this research study unlatched the
closed doors of governance boards, and it opened up new possibilities for those seeking
best in class practices that both corporate and academic boards can embrace.
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Appendix A
Interview Questions Related to Research Question One
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1.

How many members are there on the corporate board of the company that you
serve as a director?

2.

How would you describe the state of term limits and age limits on the corporate
board you served?

3.

How many committees are there on the corporate board?

4.

How would describe the selection process for corporate board membership?

5.

How would you describe the expertise level sought for the corporate board
membership?

6.

How many members are there on the academic board that you serve?

7.

How would you describe the influence of board size on board dynamics?

8.

How would you describe the state of term limits and age limits on the academic
board you serve?

10.

How would you describe the selection process for academic board membership?

11.

How would you describe the expertise level sought for the academic board
membership?

12.

How would you describe the challenges for corporate boards to protect
shareholder value in comparison to academic boards’ responsibility to protect the
mission in academic institutions?

13.

How would you describe and compare the decision-making processes of corporate
and academic boards?

14.

How would you describe your personal and professional rewards in serving on
corporate and academic boards?
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15.

Academic boards are chaired by individuals outside the organization, while many
corporate boards are chaired by individuals inside the corporation. Please describe
your perceptions of why these two structures are suitable or not.
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Appendix B
Interview Questions Related to Research Question Two
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1.

How would you describe any governance practices on corporate boards that you
would recommend be adopted by academic boards?

2.

How would you describe governance practices on academic boards that you
would recommend be adopted by corporate boards?

3.

How would you describe and provide examples of how corporate board
governance has influenced academic board governance?

4.

Would you like to discuss something I did not mention about your experiences
serving on both corporate and academic boards?
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